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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
**SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

29 BENWORTH CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC,

30 Case No.

31 Petitioner,

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**NOTICE OF PETITION AND PETITION**  
**TO VACATE FINAL ARBITRATION**  
**AWARD**

39 v.

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1                   **TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2                   **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on Petitioner Benworth Capital Partners, LLC (“Benworth”) will  
3 and hereby does petition and move this Court, pursuant to Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,  
4 9 U.S.C. § 10, *et seq.* (the “FAA”), for an order vacating the corrected final award issued by Arbitrator  
5 Alexander Brainerd, Esq. (the “Arbitrator”) on June 26, 2024 (the “Final Award”), which incorporated  
6 the interim award issued by the Arbitrator on December 21, 2023 (the “Interim Award”), in favor of  
7 Respondent Oto Analytics, LLC f/k/a Oto Analytics, Inc. d/b/a Womply (“Womply”), ordering Benworth  
8 to pay Womply (1) the principal amount of \$86,299,892; (2) pre-award interest totaling \$25,363,697.68;  
9 and (3) attorneys’ fees and costs totaling \$6,256,665.04.

10                  Vacatur of the Final Award is warranted on three grounds. First, under Section 10(a)(4) of the  
11 FAA, the Arbitrator “exceeded [his] powers” by ignoring undisputed, legally dispositive facts in manifest  
12 disregard of the law while also disregarding controlling federal regulations that were incorporated into  
13 the parties’ agreements to achieve a result the Arbitrator believed was fair, resulting in an irrational award  
14 that does not draw its essence from the parties’ agreements. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Second, the Final Award  
15 is unenforceable because it compels Benworth to violate an explicit, well-defined Federal law that  
16 specifically prohibits the relief ordered by the Arbitrator. Finally, under Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA, the  
17 Arbitrator is “guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone” the proceedings until the federal government  
18 completes its investigation of Womply concerning the same issues that were decided in the Final Award,  
19 which foreclosed Benworth from presenting evidence pertinent and material to its defenses and  
20 counterclaims. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).

21                  Benworth files this petition as a new action based on 9 U.S.C. § 12, which contemplates that a  
22 party may file an independent action to vacate an arbitral award by providing that the court in which the  
23 petition to vacate is filed may enter an order “staying the proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the  
24 award.” Benworth has marked this action as related to *Oto Analytics, LLC F/K/A Oto Analytics, Inc. d/b/a*  
25 *Womply v. Benworth Capital Partners, LLC*, No. 3:24-cv-03975-AMO, so that the cases may be related  
26 under Local Rule 3-12.

1 The Petition is based on this Notice of Petition, the attached Petition, the accompanying Appendix  
2 in support of the Petition, all papers and records filed in this matter, all other matters on which the Court  
3 may take judicial notice, and any further argument or evidence that may be made or submitted at the  
4 hearing on this Petition.

5  
6 Dated: August 7, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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22	<i>United Food &amp; Com. Workers Union, Loc. 1119, AFL-CIO v. United Markets, Inc.,</i> 784 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) .....	50
23	<i>United Transp. Union v. Union Pac. R. Co.,</i> 116 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1997) .....	27, 62
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2	9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).....	2, 27, 63
3	9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).....	2, 25
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## 1 INTRODUCTION

2 This is one of the rare cases where the Court should vacate an arbitral award. The Final Award  
3 jeopardizes a federally authorized loan program that the Arbitrator swore to uphold. And the Arbitrator  
4 jeopardizes that federal relief program by expressly ignoring the implementing federal regulations he  
5 agreed to faithfully apply. In fact, in one instance, the Arbitrator indicated he would refuse to enforce  
6 federal regulations even if he thought they were applicable. This Court cannot allow a single private  
7 arbitrator to have the unreviewable power to nullify the mandates of Congress and redefine federal law.  
8 Otherwise, private parties may, through private arbitration agreements, not only thwart federal law but  
9 also compromise the integrity of federal regimes.

10 This case arises out of the unprecedented Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) administered  
11 by the U.S. Small Business Association (“SBA”) in response to the devastating economic consequences  
12 of the COVID-19 Pandemic. Through a simple application process, small businesses and self-employed  
13 individuals could obtain government-backed loans that were forgivable so long as the borrower  
14 complied with the PPP requirements. During the first round of PPP funding, however, thousands of  
15 applicants, who were primarily minorities, struggled to find banks that would approve their PPP loan  
16 applications because the costs associated with servicing smaller loans greatly outweighed the fees paid  
17 to banks. The SBA sought to remedy that inequity during the second round of PPP funding by  
18 incentivizing lenders with higher lender processing fees for smaller loans.

19 Womply sought to capitalize on the second round of PPP funding. Womply developed a  
20 technology platform, known as “Fast Lane,” which it described as “a simple, web-based data collection  
21 process” designed to streamline the PPP application process for self-employed individuals. According  
22 to Toby Scammell, a convicted felon who served as the CEO and co-founder of Womply, Womply  
23 designed Fast Lane to “help with eligibility, qualification, verification, and fraud detection” for PPP  
24 loan applications. To that end, Womply incorporated “multiple layers of fraud prevention and identity  
25 verification, which is essential to serving PPP loans at scale in accordance with government rules.”

26 Fast Lane ostensibly worked, in the sense that, by the end of the PPP in May 2021, Womply  
27 facilitated the approval of more than 1 million PPP loan applications totaling approximately \$16 billion  
28 in taxpayer funded PPP loans. And through its partnerships with the PPP lenders who funded those

1 loans, Womply collected nearly **\$2 billion** in taxpayer-funded lender processing fees with approximately  
 2 **\$465 million** of those fees coming from Benworth alone.

3 Benworth was an ideal PPP partner for Womply. Benworth is a minority-owned and mission-  
 4 driven lender that the SBA and Department of Treasury approved to administer PPP loans. Benworth  
 5 also had a credit facility with the Federal Reserve Bank that provided the monies necessary to fund the  
 6 PPP loans. Based on Womply's representations concerning Fast Lane's fraud detection and prevention  
 7 capabilities, Benworth agreed to partner with Womply in the PPP.

8 The partnership worked as follows. Through Fast Lane, Womply collected, analyzed, and  
 9 verified all the information and documents borrowers were required to submit to apply for a PPP loan.  
 10 After the borrower completed the Fast Lane application process, Womply deployed its fraud prevention  
 11 and detection capabilities to filter out ineligible PPP borrowers. Only after the borrower passed these  
 12 fraud measures would Womply refer to Benworth the borrower's PPP loan application package.  
 13 Benworth was then responsible for reviewing the PPP loan application package, disbursing the funds  
 14 for the PPP loan, and servicing the PPP loan. PPP loan servicing obligations include processing  
 15 forgiveness applications, collecting and applying loan and forgiveness payments, submitting monthly  
 16 reports to the SBA, and monitoring the loans for issues relating to fraud. Benworth's PPP loan servicing  
 17 obligations continue to this day.

18 Womply and Benworth initially memorialized their partnership in an extensive "agent  
 19 agreement" that described in detail the services Womply would provide. But when the SBA extended  
 20 the second round of PPP funding from March to May 2021, Womply effectively forced Benworth to  
 21 enter a series of new agreements. Although Womply has conceded that the services provided under both  
 22 sets of agreements were the same, the new agreements dramatically increased the fees Benworth would  
 23 owe Womply. In fact, the new agreements called for Benworth to pay Womply nearly 90% of all the  
 24 lender processing fees it received from the SBA. Specifically, the new agreements provided for three  
 25 categories of fees: (1) a "Referral Fee" in the amount of 1% of the PPP loan amount; (2) a flat \$250  
 26 "API Fee" for each funded PPP loan; and (3) a tier-based "Technology Fee" that was calculated as up  
 27 to 80% of the lender processing fees Benworth received from the SBA. However, like with the original  
 28 agent agreement, the new agreements were subject to SBA regulations.

1       Shortly after the parties executed the new agreements, federal and state governmental agencies  
2 began subpoenaing Benworth for information relating to suspected fraudulent PPP loans that were  
3 referred to Benworth by Womply. Because the SBA may not guarantee purchase fraudulent PPP loans,  
4 which exposed Benworth to significant liability to the Federal Reserve Bank, Benworth terminated its  
5 relationship with Womply. Womply then induced Benworth to rescind its termination based on  
6 assurances that Womply would improve its fraud prevention measures. Benworth's concerns have since  
7 come to fruition.

8       At the conclusion of the PPP, Benworth funded more than 305,000 Womply-referred PPP loans  
9 totaling over \$4 billion of taxpayer funds. And Benworth paid Womply \$464,991,487, or 68.3% of the  
10 lender processing fees Benworth received from the SBA. But nearly half a billion dollars is not enough  
11 for Womply. Womply has also demanded an additional \$200 million from Benworth. When Benworth  
12 refused, Womply cut off Benworth's access to the files that Benworth needed to service the PPP loans.  
13 And those servicing obligations are substantial. Benworth is responsible for responding to subpoenas,  
14 communicating with borrowers about the forgiveness and/or repayment process, monthly reporting to  
15 the SBA, cooperating with SBA audits and government agency investigations into fraud, submitting  
16 guarantee purchase applications, and handling PPP loans that are in collections. Womply then  
17 commenced the Arbitration.

18       The SBA regulations incorporated into the parties' agreements were the focus of Benworth's  
19 defenses and counterclaims in the Arbitration Womply commenced after terminating Benworth's access  
20 to the PPP loans files. Benworth contended that Womply could not prove Benworth breached the  
21 agreements because the SBA promulgated a PPP rule that capped at 1% the SBA lender fees that PPP  
22 lenders may share with their agents. Specifically, the rule provides that "[t]he total amount an agent may  
23 collect from the lender for assistance in preparing an application for a PPP loan (including referral to  
24 the lender) may not exceed . . . [o]ne (1) percent for loans of not more than \$350,000" (the "Agent Fee  
25 Cap"). 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020). The SBA determined that the Agent Fee Cap was  
26 reasonable given the minimal PPP "application requirements and the fees that lenders receive for making  
27 PPP loans." *Id.* And it makes common sense—PPP lenders, like Benworth, carry all the risk and  
28 responsibility for processing and servicing PPP loans.

1       In addition to the Agent Fee Cap, Benworth argued that SBA rules also preclude Womply from  
 2 demanding more fees because of its status as a lender service provider. Under SBA regulations and  
 3 standard operating procedures, which Womply agreed to be bound by, Womply is a lender service  
 4 provider because, at a minimum, it collected and verified eligibility and financial information from PPP  
 5 loan applicants to provide to Benworth. Those same SBA regulations and standard operating procedures  
 6 preclude lenders from paying lender service providers and other agents unless the SBA has reviewed  
 7 their compensation agreements. It is undisputed here that none of the parties' agreements were submitted  
 8 to or reviewed by the SBA.

9       Benworth's position in the Arbitration was corroborated by a comprehensive 128-page  
 10 congressional report titled, "*We Are Not the Fraud Police*": *How Fintechs Facilitated Fraud In The*  
 11 *Paycheck Protection Program* (the "*Congressional Report*"). The Congressional Report was published  
 12 in early December 2022 by the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus  
 13 Crisis after an independent investigation that spanned more than a year. After reviewing documents  
 14 submitted by Womply and Benworth, considering a presentation made to it by Womply, and  
 15 interviewing officials from the SBA, the Select Subcommittee found, among other things, that:

- 16       • Womply misrepresented to lenders its relationship with the SBA and improperly leveraged  
       its close relationships with Trump Administration officials;
- 17       • Womply mischaracterized its status as a "technology service provider" to avoid SBA  
       regulations;
- 18       • Womply likely described itself as a "technology service provider" because the criminal  
       history of Womply's CEO, Toby Scammell, could have excluded Womply from providing  
       PPP loan services; and
- 19       • Womply and its founders each obtained suspicious PPP loans.

20       As a result of the Congressional Report, the SBA immediately suspended Womply from doing any  
 21 business with it and launched an investigation into Womply's compliance with PPP loan program  
 22 requirements. Womply remains suspended from doing business with the SBA.

23       Benworth repeatedly moved the Arbitrator to postpone the hearing or defer ruling on the merits  
 24 of the parties' dispute pending the completion of the SBA's investigation. The results of the SBA's  
 25 investigation were pertinent and material to Benworth's defenses and counterclaims in the Arbitration.  
 26 For example, Benworth alleged that Womply must return the approximately \$420 million in fees that

1 Benworth paid in excess of the Agent Fee Cap. Womply contended that it has no obligation to return  
 2 these unlawful fees because the parties' agreements include a provision stating that the SBA must first  
 3 determine that its fees are unlawful before it has to return the fees to Benworth. The results of the SBA's  
 4 investigation are the only evidence Benworth could have presented on that issue because the Arbitrator  
 5 precluded Benworth from offering any SBA determinations through declaration or through testimony  
 6 absent Benworth meeting requirements that it had no ability to comply with, including requiring  
 7 Benworth to force a non-party government official over whom it had no control to sit for a deposition  
 8 with less than a week's notice. Despite acknowledging that the results of the SBA's investigation of  
 9 Womply may render his award "advisory," the Arbitrator refused to await the results of the investigation  
 10 and rendered the Award without the benefit of the SBA's conclusions.

11 The conclusions in the Final Award not only show that the Arbitrator should have awaited the  
 12 results of the SBA's investigation, but also that the Arbitrator had no intent of applying the controlling  
 13 SBA rules and regulations—which, again, were incorporated into the parties' agreements—to the  
 14 undisputed facts. The undisputed, legally dispositive facts, along with the factual findings in the Final  
 15 Award and the statements of the Arbitrator, all firmly establish that the Agent Fee Cap applies to the  
 16 Technology Fees and that Womply is a lender service provider. But the Arbitrator ignored the plain  
 17 language of the SBA rules and regulations to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. Indeed, the  
 18 Arbitrator concluded that even if Womply were a lender service provider (disentitling it to further fees  
 19 without SBA approval), he would not abide by the SBA regulations, because doing so would inflict a  
 20 "disproportionately harsh penalty" on Womply.

21 The Final Award is not the product of the Arbitrator interpreting the parties' agreements and  
 22 applying the controlling law to the facts. Instead, the Final Award reflects that the Arbitrator appointed  
 23 himself as the final decisionmaker on SBA policies so he could reach a result he believed was fair to  
 24 Womply. But the Arbitrator had no power to nullify the mandates of the SBA and revise the parties'  
 25 agreements.

26 As detailed below, the Ninth Circuit has vacated an arbitration award that conflicted with federal  
 27 law. *See Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 682 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 28 The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between arbitrations that merely determine "the competing interests

1 of two opposing parties" from those that also "require[] an adjudication of the coverage and application  
 2 of a federal law passed by Congress . . ." *Id.* Where an arbitrator's decision conflicts with federal law,  
 3 it cannot stand: "***We cannot empower the arbitrator to nullify the mandates of Congress . . .***" *Id.*  
 4 (emphasis added). The Arbitrator here did not simply misconstrue an agreement between two private  
 5 parties; he disregarded federal regulations, which were also incorporated into the parties' agreement.  
 6 This Court cannot permit a federal judgment that authorizes payments that federal law disallows.

7 For these reasons, as detailed below, this Court must vacate the Final Award.

#### 8 PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9 Benworth is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Florida with its principal  
 10 place of business in Coral Gables, Florida. Benworth's sole member and equity holder is Bernardo  
 11 Navarro, an individual who is domiciled in Puerto Rico.

12 Womply is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware. Womply's sole  
 13 member is Oto Holdco, LLC, which is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware.  
 14 Oto Holdco, LLC's sole member is SCAT20210724, LLC, which is a limited liability company  
 15 organized under the laws of Arizona. SCAT20210724, LLC's sole member is AltoIRA Custodian FBO  
 16 Toby Scammell Roth IRA. AltoIRA Custodian FBO Toby Scammell Roth IRA's sole beneficiary is  
 17 Toby Scammell, who is a citizen of Nevada.

18 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because  
 19 there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.00,  
 20 exclusive of interest and costs. Venue is proper in the Northern District of California under 9 U.S.C.  
 21 § 10 because the Final Award was entered in San Francisco, California, which is within this District.

#### 22 DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENT

23 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-5(b), assignment to the San Francisco Division is appropriate  
 24 under Civil Local Rule 3-2(c) because a substantial part of the conduct at issue occurred in San Francisco  
 25 County.

## BACKGROUND

Attached as **Exhibit A** is an Appendix containing the materials necessary for the Court to resolve this Petition, including the Interim Award and Final Award, certain of the Parties' briefs filed in the Arbitration, transcripts from the hearings, and joint exhibits admitted into evidence. Citations to the Appendix are as follows: (App. \_\_\_\_), indicating the bates stamped page numbers. Citations to numbered paragraphs within a document are as follows: (App. \_\_, ¶ \_\_), indicating the bates stamped page numbers and paragraph numbers. And citations to statements within a transcript are as follows: (App. \_\_ : \_\_), indicating the bates stamped page numbers and line numbers.

## I. The Paycheck Protection Program and the Parties

In response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, on March 27, 2020, Congress authorized the PPP as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), a comprehensive aid package designed to provide trillions of dollars in emergency assistance. (App. 3119.) The PPP was designed to offer qualifying small businesses government-backed loans to fund expenses, such as payroll costs, rent, and utilities. (*Id.*) Congress authorized two rounds of PPP funding, first from April 3, 2020, to August 8, 2020, and then from January 11, 2021, to June 30, 2021. (App. 3119-20.)

During the first round of PPP funding, thousands of smaller businesses, which were primarily minority-owned, struggled to find banks that would approve their applications for PPP loans because the costs associated with servicing smaller loans greatly outweighed the fees paid to banks. The SBA sought to remedy that inequity during the second round of PPP funding by allowing non-bank lenders, like Benworth, to administer PPP loans and by incentivizing those lenders with higher lender processing fees for loans less than \$50,000.

Benworth and Womply contracted during the second round of PPP funding. The parties' agreements, described in detail in Part II below, incorporated and gave controlling effect to "SBA Regulations," which include the SBA's regulations, rules, and standard operating procedures implementing the PPP. Those SBA Regulations, described below, govern the relationship between Benworth and Womply and define their respective roles in connection with PPP loans.

1                   **A. The Governing SBA Regulations, Rules, and SOPs**

2                   The PPP was not created as a standalone program; instead, it was added as a temporary expansion  
 3 of the SBA's pre-existing Section 7(a) loan program under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a).  
 4 (App. 3119.) The CARES Act authorized the SBA to guarantee PPP loans under the same terms,  
 5 conditions, and processes as other loans made under the Section 7(a) loan program, except as otherwise  
 6 provided in the CARES Act. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(B). The CARES Act also gave the SBA emergency  
 7 rulemaking authority and directed the SBA to promulgate regulations implementing the PPP within  
 8 15 days of enactment. 15 U.S.C. § 9012.

9                   To that end, on January 14, 2021, the SBA issued an interim final rule implementing the  
 10 requirements for PPP loans made after the enactment of the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses,  
 11 Nonprofits, and Venues Act ("Economic Aid Act") on December 27, 2020. *See* Business Loan Program  
 12 Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program as Amended by Economic Aid Act, 86 Fed. Reg.  
 13 3692 (Jan. 14, 2021) (the "Interim Final Rule") (App. 3848-68). The Interim Final Rule primarily restated  
 14 "existing regulatory provisions to provide lenders and new PPP borrowers a single regulation to consult  
 15 on borrower eligibility, lender eligibility, and loan application and origination requirements, as well as  
 16 general rules on increases and loan forgiveness for PPP loans." (App. 3849.) The Interim Final Rule  
 17 "**supersede[d] any conflicting Loan Program Requirement** (as defined in 13 CFR 120.10)." (App. 3851  
 18 (emphasis added).) Thus, all non-conflicting Loan Program Requirements applied to PPP loans.

19                   Only two relevant provisions of the Interim Final Rule superseded and conflicted with existing  
 20 SBA Loan Program Requirements: (1) the requirements for underwriting an SBA loan and (2) the fees  
 21 an "agent" (defined below) may collect for assisting in the preparation and referral of PPP loans.

22                   Normally, under SBA regulations and Standard Operating Procedures, lender underwriting and  
 23 lending criteria are focused on a borrower's creditworthiness and ability to repay the loan with earnings  
 24 from their business. (App. 3125, n.9.) But given the unique emergency nature of the PPP, the Interim  
 25 Final Rule limited the underwriting obligations for PPP loans. (*Id.*) Under the Interim Final Rule,  
 26 underwriting was limited to reviewing the PPP loan application and performing KYC and related checks,  
 27 confirming an applicant's certifications contained in the PPP application, submission of tax documents  
 28

1 to verify loan amount eligibility, and submission of bank or other data to confirm the applicant's  
 2 eligibility for a PPP loan. (App. 3863-64, art. III.C.3.)

3 As part of the PPP, the SBA compensated lenders by paying lender processing fees. For PPP loans  
 4 of not more than \$50,000, the SBA paid lender processing fees equal to the lesser of 50% of the loan  
 5 amount or \$2,500. (App. 3864, art. III.C.5.) But the Interim Final Rule restricted how those fees may be  
 6 shared. Specifically, the SBA limited the fees that an "agent" may collect:

7 Agents fees may not be paid out of the proceeds of a PPP loan. If a borrower has  
 8 knowingly retained an agent, such fees will be paid by the borrower. A lender is only  
 9 responsible for paying fees to an agent for services for which the lender directly contracts  
 10 with the agent. The total amount that an agent may collect from the lender for assistance  
 11 in preparing an application for a PPP loan (including referral to the lender) may not exceed  
 12 ... [o]ne (1) percent for loans of not more than \$350,000 . . . .

13 (the "Agent Fee Cap") (App. 3865, art. III.D.4). The SBA determined that the Agent Fee Cap was  
 14 "reasonable based upon the application requirements and the fees that lenders receive for making PPP  
 15 loans." (*Id.*) SBA regulations define who qualifies as an "Agent."

16 Under SBA regulations, "Agent means an authorized representative, including a[] . . . lender  
 17 service provider, or any other person representing an Applicant or Participant by conducting business  
 18 with SBA." 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(a) (2021). Conducting business with the SBA includes acting as lender  
 19 service provider, as well as "[p]reparing or submitting on behalf of an applicant an application for  
 20 financial assistance of any kind" and "[p]reparing or processing on behalf of a lender or a participant in  
 21 any of SBA's programs an application for federal financial assistance . . . ." *Id.* § 103.1(b)(1), (2), (4).

22 The SBA also clarified the meaning of "lender service provider." *Id.* § 103.1(d). The SBA  
 23 adopted specific guidance for agents who are lender service providers. *See* Small Business  
 24 Administration, Office of Capital Access, *SOP 50 10 6: Lender and Development Company Loan*  
 25 *Programs* at p. 185 (Oct. 1, 2020) (hereinafter, the "SOPs") (App. 3258-3847.) The SOPs offer a non-  
 26 exhaustive list of lender service providers, such as:

27 i. An individual or entity engaged by a 7(a) Lender to provide services for the  
 28 purposes of obtaining Federal financial assistance that include interaction with the Applicant  
 either in person **or through the use of technology**, to request or obtain eligibility and/or financial  
 information that will be provided to the 7(a) Lender. This includes Agents who:

1 a) Perform any pre-qualification review based on SBA’s eligibility and credit criteria  
 2 . . . prior to submitting the Applicant’s information to the 7(a) Lender; or  
 3

4 b) Provide to the 7(a) Lender an underwritten application, whether through *the use of*  
 5 *technology or otherwise.*

6 ii. Entities providing technology services to a 7(a) Lender that *include*  
 7 *underwriting.*

8 iii. An individual or entity generates a significant number of 7(a) Lender’s loan  
 9 originations. As a general rule, SBA considers a “significant number” to be two-thirds (66%) or  
 10 more of the 7(a) Lender’s loan originations for the prior 12 months.

11 (App. 3442 (emphasis added)); *see also*, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. at 20816, art. III.4.a. (incorporating SBA  
 12 Regulations into the PPP by providing “[l]oans will be guaranteed under the PPP under the same terms,  
 13 conditions and processes as other 7(a) loans . . . .”); (App. 3865, art. III.D.1 (same).)

14 SBA regulations require an agent or lender service provider to submit a compensation agreement  
 15 to the SBA. 13 C.F.R. § 103.5(a). All lender service provider agreements must be reviewed and approved  
 16 by the SBA. *Id.* at § 103.5(c). A lender service provider may only receive compensation from lenders  
 17 “for services provided under an SBA-reviewed LSP Agreement.” (App. 3442.) No provision of the  
 18 Interim Final Rule conflicts with these SBA Loan Program Requirements.<sup>1</sup>

## 19 B. Benworth’s Ongoing Role in the PPP

20 Prior to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Benworth had no experience with the SBA and was only a  
 21 mortgage lender. (App. 3127.) In April 2020, the SBA approved Benworth’s application to become a  
 22 PPP lender. (*Id.*) To fund the PPP loans, Benworth executed a liquidity facility with the Federal Reserve  
 23 Bank of San Francisco. The Federal Reserve then advanced the monies for the PPP loans funded by  
 24 Benworth. (App. 2962-63; App. 3041-42.) Benworth is obligated to repay the Federal Reserve for the  
 25 advances. (App. 2962-63; App. 3041-42.)

26 <sup>1</sup> Prior to the Economic Aid Act, the SBA promulgated several interim final rules implementing the PPP,  
 27 including an interim final rule issued in April 2020, which also contains the Agent Fee Cap and the  
 28 limited underwriting requirements for PPP loans. *See* Business Loan Program Temporary Changes;  
 Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811 (Apr. 15, 2020). The substantive provisions of the  
 April 2020 interim final rule are materially the same as those in the Interim Final Rule. Because all PPP  
 loans referred to Benworth by Womply were made after the enactment of the Economic Aid Act,  
 however, the Interim Final Rule controlled in the Arbitration and Benworth refers to the 2021 Interim  
 Final Rule for simplicity. Unless otherwise specified, all citations are to the 2021 Interim Final Rule.

1 During the first round of PPP funding, Benworth funded approximately 700 PPP loans. (App.  
2 3127-28.) During the second round of PPP funding, Benworth contracted with Womply and another  
3 lender service provider, Lendio, to fund PPP loans. (App. 3128.) By the end of the second round of PPP  
4 funding, Benworth funded approximately 311,000 PPP loans. (App. 1763:19-21; App. 2033:25 –  
5 2034:3.) About 305,000 of those PPP loans, totaling more than \$4 billion, were referred to Benworth by  
6 Womply. (App. 3133.) The SBA paid Benworth approximately \$680 million in fees to process and  
7 service the Womply-referred PPP loans. (App. 3141.) Benworth has paid Womply nearly \$465 million  
8 of the SBA fees. (App. 3140.)

9 Benworth’s role in the PPP did not end when the PPP loans were funded. In July 2021, the SBA  
10 issued a Procedural Notice that details the substantial requirements for lenders, like Benworth, to service  
11 PPP loans. (App. 4024-30.) Thus, unlike Womply, whose role in the PPP was limited to just a few  
12 months, Benworth will be servicing the PPP loans for five years at least. (App. 3165.) Benworth’s  
13 servicing obligations include responding to subpoenas, communicating with borrowers about the  
14 forgiveness and/or repayment process, monthly reporting to the SBA, cooperating with SBA audits,  
15 submitting guarantee purchase applications, and handling PPP loans that are in collections. (App. 2439:13  
16 – 2445:19.) Further, after Womply terminated the parties’ agreements in July 2021, Benworth was forced  
17 to respond to subpoenas without access to the lender-facing portal to review loan files that it paid Womply  
18 for—Teslar—which, in turn, meant that Benworth did not have access to the PPP loan files it needed to  
19 respond to the subpoenas. (App. 2412:10 – 2413:25.)

20 The lack of access to the PPP loan files created a significant hardship for Benworth. The SBA  
21 denied Benworth the guaranteed purchase of thousands of Womply-referred loans principally because  
22 Benworth was unable to provide the SBA with certain loan files held hostage by Womply. (App. 2962-  
23 64; App. 3041-42.) As of now, the PPP loans for which the SBA has denied Benworth guarantee purchase  
24 total more than \$60 million. That is a mounting debt Benworth owes the Federal Reserve, which has been  
25 only further complicated by the Final Award. The Final Award requires Benworth to relinquish all the  
26 funds the federal government gave Benworth to fund and operate a federal program and give them to  
27 Womply—and to do so in violation of federal law. In fact, the Federal Reserve has warned that Womply’s  
28 efforts to collect on the Final Award “cripple the ability of Benworth to continue” servicing its PPP loans.

1 *See* Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Motion to Intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (Doc. 127) at  
 2, No. 3:23-cv-01034-GMM (D.P.R. July 10, 2024).

3 **C. Womply’s Limited Role in the PPP**

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 As discussed in more detail below, Womply has been admonished by the federal government for  
 15 facilitating fraudulent PPP loans, including in a congressional report that caused the SBA to suspend  
 16 Womply from conducting business with SBA and to launch an investigation into Womply’s compliance  
 17 with SBA Loan Program Requirements. *See infra*, pp. 20-23. More recently, the Federal Trade  
 18 Commission sued Womply for engaging in deceptive practices with respect to the PPP and Womply  
 19 settled that lawsuit for \$26 million. (*See generally* App. 3072-90, 3099-3108.)

20 **II. The Parties’ Agreements**

21 In February 2021, during the second round of PPP funding, Benworth and Womply were  
 22 introduced by a mutual business connection. (App. 3128.) As a minority-owned and mission-driven  
 23 lender, Benworth was an ideal PPP collaborator for Womply because it needed a lender who could  
 24 handle the increased volume of Spanish-speaking borrowers who were applying for PPP loans through  
 25 its technology platform. Womply then sent Benworth a presentation describing its technology platform.  
 26 (App. 3915.) According to Womply, its technology platform [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED] (App. 3925.) Based on Womply’s representations in the

1 presentation, Benworth agreed to contract with Womply. All the agreements between Benworth and  
 2 Womply specified that the terms and fees would be subject to SBA Regulations. *See infra*, pp. 14-15.

3 **A. The Agent Agreement**

4 Benworth and Womply entered into an agreement for Womply to refer PPP loan application  
 5 packages to Benworth that had been prepared using Womply's technology platform (the "Agent  
 6 Agreement"). (*See generally* App. 3932-52.) [REDACTED]

7 (App. 3932.) [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] (App. 3933, § 5  
 9 (emphasis added).)

10 The Agent Agreement says Womply will provide both "Processing Services" and "Technology  
 11 Services." As to Processing Services, Womply agreed to the following:

12 [REDACTED]  
 13 [REDACTED]  
 14 [REDACTED]  
 15 [REDACTED]  
 16 [REDACTED]  
 17 [REDACTED]  
 18 [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED]  
 20 [REDACTED]

21 As to Technology Services, Womply agreed to "make available to Lender and loan applicants a  
 22 technology platform," (App. 3934, § 5(b)), that conducted the following services (among others):  
 23 [REDACTED]  
 24 [REDACTED]  
 25 [REDACTED]

26  
 27 <sup>2</sup> "KYC" refers to "Know Your Customer," "AML" to "Anti Money Laundering," and "BSA" to "Bank  
 28 Secrecy Act."

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 (App. 3935-36, § 6(a)-(b).) [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] (App. 3941, § 18.)

9 The parties entered into their operative agreements two months after the Agent Agreement, but  
10 as Womply conceded during the Arbitration, [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]

#### 15 **B. The Operative Agreements**

16 The second round of PPP funding was set to expire on March 31, 2021. (App. 3129.) In mid-  
17 March 2021, Congress voted to extend that deadline to May 31, 2021. (*Id.*) Around this time, Womply  
18 began communicating with its lawyers about its agreement with Benworth and drafting new agreements.  
19 (*Id.*)

20 Approximately two months after entering into the Agent Agreement, in April 2021, Womply  
21 demanded that Benworth enter into a series of new agreements to replace the Agent Agreement. The  
22 new agreements consisted of (1) an Amended and Restated PPP Loan Referral Agreement (“Referral  
23 Agreement”) (App. 3982-85); (2) the Womply Developer Order Form (“Order Form”) (App. 3986-88);  
24 and (3) the Womply Master Developer Agreement (“MDA” and together with the Referral Agreement  
25 and the Order Form, the “Agreements”) (App. 4003-14). The Agreements were fully integrated. (E.g.,  
26 App. 3985, § 16.)

27 The stated purpose of entering the Agreements was to “amend the economics” of the parties’  
28 prior agreement “to provide an early-payment discount to” Benworth. (App. 3982; *see also* App. 3984,

1   § 9 (incorporating recitals from page 1 into the agreement.) However, as the face of the Agreements  
 2 shows, Womply provided no “early-payment discount” to Benworth. In the Arbitration, Benworth  
 3 contended that the real reason for the new Agreements was to accomplish Womply’s goal of avoiding  
 4 being characterized as an Agent or lender service provider under SBA regulations. (App. 81-82; App.  
 5 123-25; App. 337.) For example, Womply added language reciting that it “was not a lender service  
 6 provider.” (App. 3982, § 1.3; App. 3987, § 1.3.) Womply also omitted from the Agreements a provision  
 7 in the Agent Agreement where Womply represented and warranted that all loans referred to Benworth  
 8 “will be originated and underwritten in compliance with Applicable Law and SBA Regulations.”  
 9 (Compare App. 3945, (a)(iii) with Agreements.) The Agreements, nonetheless, remained subject to SBA  
 10 regulations notwithstanding any provision therein to the contrary. (App. 3984, § 9; App. 3988, § 4.)

11   The choice of law clauses in the Agreements provide that “SBA Regulations” shall govern the  
 12 agreements. (App. 3984, § 9; App. 3988, § 4.) The choice of law provision in the Referral Agreement  
 13 reads in relevant part:

14   This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the  
 15 State of California, without regard to the provisions of the conflict of laws thereof.  
 16 Notwithstanding the foregoing or any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, this  
 17 agreement is subject to all Applicable Laws, including SBA Regulations. ***In the event of  
 18 any conflict between the governing law and the SBA Regulations (defined below), the  
 19 SBA Regulations shall control.*** “SBA Regulations” means all PPP requirements and SBA  
 20 guidelines under the CARES Act, the Economic Aid Act, the PPP Flexibility Act, any  
 21 rules or guidance that have been issued by the SBA implementing the PPP, including SBA  
 22 regulations published at 86 Fed. Reg. 3692 (Jan. 14, 2021) and 85 Fed. Reg. 20811 (Apr.  
 23 15, 2020) and any subsequent Interim Final Rules and other guidance as may have been  
 24 or may be subsequently issued by SBA or the U.S. Department of the Treasury with  
 25 respect to the origination, servicing and forgiveness of loans under the PPP and Frequently  
 26 Asked Questions, or any other applicable SBA loan requirements, including those codified  
 27 in 13 CFR part 120, in each case as amended, supplemented or modified from time to  
 28 time.

(App. 3984, § 9 (emphasis added); *see also* App. 3988, § 4 (same).) The Agreements further include  
 clauses requiring disputes to be resolved by arbitration in San Francisco, California under the rules of  
 JAMS. (App. 3985 § 10 (emphasis added); *see also* App. 3988, § 4.)

It is undisputed that the Agreements were neither submitted to nor approved by the SBA. (App.  
 3130.) Nonetheless, the Agreements called for Benworth to pay Womply three categories of fees. The

1 Referral Agreement required Benworth to pay Womply “Referral Fees” in “consideration of Womply  
 2 providing [Benworth] with Referrals,” which was an amount equal to 1% of the PPP loan amount for  
 3 each referred loan Womply referred to Benworth. (App. 3982, § 2.2.) However, the Referral Agreement  
 4 acknowledges that Womply is entitled to the Referral Fees only for those PPP loans where it was “the  
 5 first to submit a complete package” to Benworth. (App. 3982, § 1.1.) Benworth would owe the Referral  
 6 Fee only if the SBA approved the PPP loan application, and Benworth funded the loan.

7 The Order Form required Benworth to pay Womply two additional fees: (i) a \$250 API  
 8 (application program interface) Fee for each referred loan, and (ii) a tier-based “Technology Fee” for  
 9 each referred loan that exceeds \$250. (App. 3987, § 2.1.) The Order Form provides that the “API Fee”  
 10 compensates Womply for the “API Package”:

API Package	Payments
Tax Documents	
Business Fraud Analytics	
Bank Data	
Identity	
Account Verification	
PPP Portfolio Management System	\$250 per funded PPP loan sourced through the Services (the “API Fee”) plus the Technology Fee set forth in Section 2 below.

19 (App. 3986.) Womply testified that the API Fee was intended to compensate it for the use of Teslar.  
 20 (App. 921:9-17, 922:7-10.)

21 The “Technology Fee” compensated Womply for the “Services” identified in the Order Form.  
 22 The “Services” were defined as “integrations with and/or links to certain third-party service providers  
 23 (including, without limitation, Plaid, DocuSign, LexisNexis, Teslar, Inscribe, Ocrolus, AWS Mechanical  
 24 Turk, Mindee, Person, Twilio, Sendgrid, etc.)” (the “Technology Services”).<sup>3</sup> (App. 3987, § 1.2.)

25  
 26 <sup>3</sup> The Arbitrator used the capitalized term, “Technology Services,” throughout the Final Award when  
 27 describing Womply’s services under the Order Form. (App. 3114-15.) In defining Womply’s  
 28 “Technology Services,” the Arbitrator adopted the definition of that term in the Agent Agreement. (See App. 3115, n.3 (“Technology Services is defined in the parties’ Agent Agreement in paragraph 5.b, where an extensive list of eight distinct services is listed.”).)

1 According to the Order Form, the Technology Services generated the information that would accompany  
 2 a referral. (App. 3987, § 1.1.) It is undisputed that Benworth did not receive links to these third-party  
 3 technology solutions. (App. 3150.)

4 Benworth was required to pay the Technology Fees within fifteen days of Benworth receiving  
 5 the lender processing fees from the SBA. (App. 3988, § 2.3.) However, the Order Form requires Womply  
 6 to return to Benworth any Technology Fees that “the SBA or governmental agency determines were not  
 7 in compliance with applicable SBA and/or PPP Loan Program Requirements.” (*Id.*) Like the Referral  
 8 Fees, Benworth would owe the Technology and API Fees only if the SBA approved the PPP loan  
 9 application and Benworth funded the loan. (App. 3986; App. 3987, § 2.1.)

10 **C. Womply’s Technology Platform**

11 Womply’s technology platform consisted of a borrower-facing portal (“Fast Lane”) and a lender-  
 12 facing portal (the “Teslar Portal”).

13 **1. Fast Lane**

14 Fast Lane assisted users with preparing PPP loan applications. [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]  
 16 [REDACTED]  
 17 [REDACTED]  
 18 [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED]  
 20 [REDACTED]  
 21 [REDACTED]  
 22 [REDACTED]  
 23 [REDACTED]

24  
 25 \_\_\_\_\_  
 26 <sup>4</sup> Two videos prepared by Womply that walk users through the process of applying for a PPP loan through  
 27 Fast Lane were admitted into evidence as App. 4001 and App. 4002. Benworth will submit copies of  
 28 those videos to the Court in accordance with the Local Rules for the Northern District of California.  
 However, a transcript of App. 4002 was also made a part of the record in the Arbitration and is included  
 within the Appendix accompanying this Petition. (See App. 1378-1400.)

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]

16 In early May 2021, it became apparent to Benworth that Womply's technology was not  
17 performing as advertised. (App. 70-71.) Womply intentionally or negligently misrepresented the  
18 capabilities of its technology platform, which failed in multiple respects, causing Benworth to fund a  
19 yet-to-be determined number of fraudulent loans. (*Id.*) Benworth was concerned about the fraudulent  
20 loans because the SBA may not guarantee PPP loans subject to fraud, which would expose Benworth to  
21 a dangerous amount of liability. (*Id.*) Benworth conveyed this concern to Womply. (*Id.*)

22 Benworth thus elected to terminate its relationship with Womply on May 10, 2021. (*Id.*) In  
23 response, Womply promised to improve its technology platform. (*Id.*) Benworth, relying on that  
24 promise, rescinded its termination and continued the relationship with Womply. (*Id.*)

25 **2. The Teslar Portal**

26 The Teslar Portal is the mechanism through which Womply referred to Benworth PPP loan  
27 applicants and their complete loan packages.  
28 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]

**D. Benworth Pays Womply Nearly \$465 Million in Fees**

9 By the conclusion of the PPP, Benworth funded approximately 305,000 Womply-referred loans.  
10 (App. 3140-41.) Benworth received approximately \$680 million in lender processing fees from the SBA  
11 to fund and service these PPP loans. (App. 3141.) Of that \$680 million, Benworth paid Womply  
12 \$464,991,487 in fees, which represents **68.3%** of all the fees the SBA paid Benworth to not only process  
13 but also service the PPP loans. (*Id.*)

14 **III. The Arbitration**

15 **A. Womply's Claims**

16 On August 25, 2021, Womply initiated the Arbitration, asserting three causes of action:  
17 (1) Breach of Contract for Failure to Pay Referral Fees; (2) Breach of Contract for Failure to Pay API  
18 Fees; and (3) Breach of Contract for Failure to Pay Technology Fees. (App. 3115-16.) On the  
19 Technology Fees, Womply alleged it was entitled to Technology Fees calculated at 80% for the first  
20 300,000 PPP loans referred to and funded by Benworth. (App. 3141.) Womply also requested pre-  
21 judgment compound interest at 1.5% per month (18% per annum) and an award of attorneys' fees and  
22 costs. (App. 3167.) In total, Womply sought more than **\$200 million** in additional compensation from  
23 Benworth. (App. 2625.)

24 **B. Benworth's Defenses and Counterclaims**

25 Benworth answered the demand and asserted various affirmative defenses and counterclaims.  
26 (App. 73-78.) Throughout the Arbitration, Benworth relied on two principal defenses. First, Womply  
27 could not prove that Benworth breached the Order Form because the Technology Fees were subject to

1 the Agent Fee Cap and Benworth had already paid Womply fees in excess of the Agent Fee Cap. (App.  
 2 3115-17.) Second, Womply could not prove that Benworth breached any of the Agreements because  
 3 Womply acted as an agent and lender service provider and the Agreements were not submitted to the  
 4 SBA, which is a prerequisite to Womply receiving compensation from Benworth under the Agreements.  
 5 (App. 3115; App. 345; App. 2601, 2605; App. 2670-74.) Benworth also sought affirmative relief on  
 6 similar grounds. (App. 3117.)

7 In addition, Benworth sought a declaration in Counterclaim I that Womply was required to  
 8 promptly transmit all loan files for the PPP loans Womply referred to Benworth. (App. 74-75.) During  
 9 the Arbitration, Womply finally delivered batches of loan files to Benworth. (App. 2962-64; App. 3041-  
 10 46.) Womply represented that these batches constituted all the loan files and thereby rendered  
 11 Counterclaim I “moot” to the extent it sought a declaration concerning the loan files. (App. 2962-64;  
 12 App. 3041-46.) Based on these representations—which turned out to be false as discussed below, *see*  
 13 *infra*, pp. 24-25—the parties did not continue to litigate this issue. (App. 2962-64; App. 3041-46.)  
 14 Benworth also asserted “promissory fraud” as an affirmative defense based on Womply’s defective  
 15 technology platform. (App. 73.)

### 16 C. Pre-Hearing Proceedings

17 Prior to the March 2023 hearing, the Arbitrator issued orders on various matters, including  
 18 discovery motions and Womply’s multiple requests for summary disposition. (App. 3117.) On January  
 19 19, 2022, the Arbitrator issued the Parties’ Joint Stipulated Protective Order. (*Id.*) The Arbitrator  
 20 subsequently granted Womply relief from that order so it could pursue claims against Benworth, its CEO  
 21 and his wife, and an affiliate of Benworth in Puerto Rico federal court for purported fraudulent transfers.  
 22 (App. 262-64.) The Arbitrator also partially granted Benworth’s motion to disqualify Womply’s expert,  
 23 a former SBA official, “to the extent that Womply wanted” the former SBA official “to give a legal  
 24 opinion on how to apply the SBA regulations, but allowed” that official “to testify about the history of  
 25 the PPP program and regulatory scheme[.]” (App. 3117-18.)

### 26 IV. The Arbitrator Refuses to Hear From the SBA

27 While the Arbitration was pending, in early December 2022, Congress’s Select Subcommittee  
 28 on the Coronavirus Crisis issued the Congressional Report. (App. 132.) The Congressional Report is a

1 damning exposé on the unlawful and unethical conduct Womply engaged in, in connection with the  
2 PPP, including its dealings with Benworth.

3 The Select Subcommittee found, *inter alia*, that (1) Womply misrepresented its relationship with  
4 the SBA and improperly leveraged its close relationships with Trump Administration officials;  
5 (2) Womply mischaracterized its status as a “technology service provider” to avoid SBA regulations;  
6 (3) Womply likely described itself as a “technology service provider” because the criminal history of  
7 Womply’s CEO, Toby Scammell, could have excluded Womply from providing PPP loan services;  
8 (4) Womply was the “path of least resistance” for criminals and fraudsters because of its defective fraud  
9 prevention measures; (5) Womply and its founders each obtained suspicious PPP loans; and (6) Womply  
10 disseminated the sensitive personal and financial data of hundreds of thousands of PPP borrowers to  
11 Solo Global, a company recently formed by Womply’s founders. (App. 137-39.) These findings and  
12 others in the Congressional Report corroborated Benworth’s position in the Arbitration.

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

26 [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED]

28 [REDACTED]

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21 [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED]

25 **V. The Awards**

26 **A. The March 2023 Hearing**

27 A seven-day in-person evidentiary hearing (the “Hearing”) was held before the Arbitrator at the  
28 San Francisco office of JAMS on March 20-24 and 27-28, 2023. (App. 3118.) At the Hearing, the

1 Arbitrator heard testimony from six witnesses. (*Id.*) Multiple exhibits were also admitted into evidence  
 2 before and during the Hearing. (App. 3119.) The Arbitrator, however, refused to consider the  
 3 Congressional Report, calling it “rank hearsay.” (App. 3118.)

4 On May 12, 2023, the parties submitted post-Hearing briefs. (App. 3119.) Reply briefs were  
 5 submitted on May 31, 2023. (*Id.*) Virtual closing arguments took place on June 29, 2023. (*Id.*) The parties  
 6 also submitted to the Arbitrator copies of the slides they used during their closing arguments on the final  
 7 hearing day (June 29, 2023) and a Joint Compendium of SBA Rules and Regulations. (*Id.*)

8 **B. The Interim Award**

9 The parties were served with the Interim Award on December 21, 2023. (App. 2903.) In the  
 10 Interim Award, the Arbitrator ruled in favor of Womply on nearly every issue, with the only exception  
 11 being the conclusion that the 70% tier applied to all PPP loans Womply referred to Benworth. (*See generally* App. 2902-56.) The Arbitrator denied Benworth any relief on its counterclaims and  
 12 affirmative defenses. (App. 2955-56.) The Interim Award provided that subsequent proceedings would  
 13 be held to determine pre-judgment interest and costs of collection, including attorneys’ fees. (*Id.*)

14 **C. Post-Interim Award Proceedings**

15 At the invitation of the Arbitrator, Benworth moved for reconsideration of the Interim Award.  
 16 As relevant here, Benworth asked the Arbitrator to reconsider four rulings: (1) whether Benworth was  
 17 entitled to a declaration that Womply must transmit all loans files to Benworth; (2) whether the Agent  
 18 Fee Cap applies to the Technology Fees; (3) whether Womply acted as a lender service provider; and  
 19 (4) whether Womply was entitled to additional compensation since the Agreements were not submitted  
 20 to the SBA. (App. 2962-73; App. 3041-52.)

21 With respect to the transmission of loan files, Benworth explained to the Arbitrator that recent  
 22 events revealed that issue was not moot and denying Benworth relief would cause substantial prejudice.  
 23 (App. 2962-64; App. 3041-46.) For example, and contrary to the Interim Award’s conclusion that PPP  
 24 loans were 100% guaranteed by the SBA, the SBA had denied Benworth the guaranteed purchase of  
 25 thousands of Womply-referred PPP loans, totaling millions of dollars, which Benworth now owes the  
 26 Federal Reserve, because Benworth has been unable to provide the SBA with the necessary loan files  
 27 held hostage by Womply. (App. 2962-64; App. 3041-46.) The issue with the Federal Reserve has put  
 28

1 Benworth in a compromising position because the Federal Reserve has directed Benworth not to pay  
 2 Womply the amounts awarded by the Arbitrator. (App. 3097.)

3 The Arbitrator largely denied Benworth's motion for reconsideration. (App. 3060-61.) However,  
 4 the Arbitrator ruled that Benworth was entitled to a declaration concerning the transmission of loan files  
 5 and stated that the Final Award would reflect this ruling. (App. 3056-57.) The order denying  
 6 reconsideration also set forth the procedures for resolving the remaining issues concerning pre-judgment  
 7 interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. (App. 3059-60.)

8 **D. The Final Award**

9 Following the submission of the Parties' pre-hearing briefs on the issues of pre-judgment interest,  
 10 attorneys' fees, and costs, the Arbitrator held a hearing via Zoom commencing on April 8, 2024, and  
 11 continuing on April 9 and 11, 2024. (App. 3168.) The Parties then submitted closing briefs. (*Id.*)

12 The Arbitrator made the initial final award on May 30, 2024, but it was not delivered to the  
 13 Parties until June 11, 2024. (App. 3113; App. 6.) Benworth timely moved to correct a computational  
 14 error in the original final award, which Womply did not oppose. (App. 3257, n. 21.) On June 26, 2024,  
 15 the Arbitrator issued the corrected Final Award. (App. 3186.)

16 In the Final Award, the Arbitrator: (1) incorporated the Interim Award with some modifications  
 17 to the Arbitrator's analysis of certain issues in response to arguments raised in Benworth's motion for  
 18 reconsideration; (2) declared that Benworth is entitled to relief on its Counterclaim I(iv) and ordered  
 19 Womply to transmit copies of borrowers' PPP loan files; (3) awarded Womply finance charges  
 20 calculated at 10% per annum simple interest, which as of May 30, 2024, equaled \$25,363,697.68;  
 21 (4) awarded Womply attorneys' fees in the amount of \$5,883,708.58; and (5) awarded Womply  
 22 \$372,956.46 in costs. (App. 3183-84.)

23 **STANDARD FOR VACATUR**

24 Benworth petitions to vacate the Final Award on three grounds, two of which are set forth in  
 25 Section 10 of the FAA. The standards applicable to each ground for vacatur are addressed below.

26 1. Vacatur of an arbitration award is appropriate where the arbitrator exceeds his powers.  
 27 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that an arbitrator exceeds his powers "when the  
 28 award is 'completely irrational' or exhibits a 'manifest disregard of the law.'" *Aspic Eng'g & Constr.*

1 *Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC*, 913 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2019) (*Aspic*). Both  
 2 circumstances apply here.

3 An award is “completely irrational” if “the arbitration decision fails to draw its essence from the  
 4 agreement.” *Aspic*, 913 F.3d at 1166 (internal quotations omitted). “To consider whether an award drew  
 5 its essence from the agreement, the court must ensure that the arbitrator looked to the words of the  
 6 contract and to the conduct of the parties.” *Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co.*, 44 F.3d  
 7 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). Courts only “enforce an arbitration award if it represents a  
 8 plausible interpretation of the contract in the context of the parties’ conduct.” *Pac. Motor Trucking Co.*  
 9 *v. Auto. Machinists Union*, 702 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). “An award  
 10 that conflicts directly with the contract cannot be a ‘plausible interpretation.’” *Id.* Simply put, “[a]n  
 11 award is completely irrational if it ignores controlling terms of the parties’ contract.” *HayDay Farms,*  
 12 *Inc. v. FeeDx Holdings, Inc.*, 55 F.4th 1232, 1241 (9th Cir. 2022).

13 “To demonstrate manifest disregard, the moving party must show that the arbitrator understood  
 14 and correctly stated the law, but proceeded to disregard the same.” *HayDay Farms*, 55 F.4th at 1241  
 15 (internal quotations omitted). “There must be some evidence in the record, other than the result, that the  
 16 arbitrators were aware of the law and intentionally disregarded it.” *Id.* “[A]n arbitrator’s failure to  
 17 recognize undisputed, legally dispositive facts may properly be deemed a manifest disregard for the  
 18 law.” *Coutee v. Barington Cap. Grp., L.P.*, 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).

19 Under either the completely irrational or manifest disregard of the law standards of review, courts  
 20 generally “must defer to an arbitrator’s conclusions even where they are erroneous.” *Am. Postal Workers*  
 21 *Union v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 682 F.2d 1280, 1284–85 (9th Cir. 1982), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983).  
 22 However, an “arbitrator’s conclusions” are not “entitled to the deference ordinarily accorded” and do  
 23 “not bind” this Court where, like here, an award is legally irreconcilable with the undisputed facts. *Id.*  
 24 at 1285.

25 Moreover, “[a]lthough an arbitrator has great freedom in determining an award, he may not  
 26 ‘dispense his own brand of industrial justice.’” *Pacific Motor Trucking Co. v. Auto. Machinists Union*,  
 27 702 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Because the award conflicts ***directly with the contract***, the court  
 28 properly vacated the award.” (emphasis added)).

2. An arbitration award may be vacated where it is contrary to public policy. *See United Transp. Union v. Union Pac. R. Co.*, 116 F.3d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing this basis for vacatur is “extremely narrow”). “To vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds, the court must find (1) ‘an explicit, well-defined policy’ and (2) that the policy ‘is one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.’” *Id.*

3. An arbitration award is also subject to vacatur where the arbitrator is “guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Arbitrators are “accorded a degree of discretion in exercising their judgment with respect to a requested postponement.” *Naing Int’l Enters., Ltd. v. Ellsworth Assocs., Inc.*, 961 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997). “Nonetheless, if the failure of an arbitrator to grant a postponement or adjournment results in the foreclosure of the presentation of ‘pertinent and material evidence,’ it is an abuse of discretion.” *Id.*

## ARGUMENT

## **I. THE AWARD MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HIS POWERS.**

The “central purpose” of the FAA is “to ensure ‘that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.’” *Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995) (quoting *Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.*, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). Because arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion,” the parties may limit the scope of an arbitrator’s powers through “specify[ing] by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.” *Volt*, 489 U.S. at 479. An arbitrator exceeds his powers when he strays from the limitations imposed by the parties. *Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co.*, 44 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Thus, when the arbitrators strayed from the limitations imposed by the parties, they exceeded their powers.”).

The choice of law clauses in the Agreements limited the scope of the Arbitrator's powers by imposing three critical rules. The first rule required the Arbitrator to apply California law and "SBA Regulations," as that term is defined in the Agreements.<sup>5</sup> The second rule compelled the Arbitrator to

<sup>5</sup> The Referral Agreement defines “SBA Regulations” to include “applicable SBA loan requirements, including those codified in 13 CFR part 120 . . . .” (App. 3984, § 9.) “SBA loan requirements,” in turn, is defined to include “SBA Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)[.]” 13 C.F.R. § 120.10. The Order

1 give controlling effect to SBA Regulations, notwithstanding any provision of the Agreements or  
 2 California law to the contrary. And the third rule obligated the Arbitrator to treat the SBA Regulations  
 3 as express terms of the parties' bargain because they were specifically incorporated in the Agreements.  
 4 *See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 99 v. Options—A Child Care & Hum. Servs. Agency*, 200 Cal. App.  
 5 4th 869, 879 n.6 (2011) (“When language of a statute or regulations is incorporated in a contract, such  
 6 language establishes contractual rights and obligations apart from its legal identity as part of a statute or  
 7 regulation.”); *300 DeHaro St. Invs. v. Dep't of Hous. & Cnty. Dev.*, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 1256 (2008)  
 8 (“When statutory language is included in a contract, it assumes a new legal identity: that of contractual  
 9 language.”).

10 The Arbitrator failed to follow the rules imposed by the parties. Rather than apply the  
 11 unambiguous language of the SBA Regulations (and, therefore, the Agreements) to the undisputed facts  
 12 concerning Womply's conduct, the Arbitrator dispensed his own brand of industrial justice. Specifically,  
 13 the Arbitrator exceeded his powers on three issues. First, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law  
 14 by ignoring undisputed, legally dispositive facts when he concluded that the Agent Fee Cap does not  
 15 apply to the Technology Fees. Second, and for similar reasons, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the  
 16 law and the Agreements when he concluded that Womply is not a lender service provider. Finally, the  
 17 Award is unenforceable because it compels Benworth to compensate Womply in violation of controlling  
 18 federal regulations.

19 **A. The Arbitrator's Application Of The Agent Fee Cap Is Legally Irreconcilable  
 20 With The Undisputed Facts.**

21 In the Arbitration, Benworth argued that the Agent Fee Cap precluded Womply from recovering  
 22 additional Technology Fees because the Technology Fees compensated Womply, in whole or in part,  
 23 for services that directly related to preparing PPP loan applications or referring PPP loan applicants to  
 24 Benworth. The Agent Fee Cap limited the “total amount that an agent may collect from the lender for  
 25 assistance in preparing an application for a PPP loan (including referral to the lender)” to “[o]ne (1)

---

26  
 27 Form adopted the Referral Agreement's definition of “SBA Regulations.” (App. 3986 (“Unless set forth  
 28 otherwise, undefined capitalized terms are defined in the MDA or Amended and Restated PPP Loan  
 Referral Agreement between the Parties (the ‘Referral Agreement’).”)).

1 percent for loans of not more than \$350,000[.]” Paycheck Protection Program as Amended by Economic  
 2 Aid Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 3709, (Jan. 14, 2021). The SBA determined that the Agent Fee Cap was  
 3 “reasonable based upon the application requirements and the fees that lenders receive for making PPP  
 4 loans.” *Id.* at 3709-10.

5 There was no dispute that Womply relied on the Technology Services to prepare PPP loan  
 6 applications and refer PPP loan applicants to Benworth. In fact, during closing arguments, Benworth  
 7 posed the following question that the Arbitrator must resolve: [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] (App. 2776:15-16.) The Arbitrator’s response  
 9 was unequivocal: [REDACTED] (App. 2776:17-  
 10 18 (emphasis added).) The Arbitrator also understood, and Womply agreed, that the Technology  
 11 Services [REDACTED] (App. 2701:7-13.) Thus, there was no  
 12 evidentiary dispute about the functions the Technology Services performed. The only dispute centered  
 13 on the conclusions to be drawn from those undisputed facts.

14 As shown below, the Arbitrator’s conclusion that the Agent Fee Cap does not apply to the  
 15 Technology Fees is legally irreconcilable with the undisputed facts. The Arbitrator conscientiously  
 16 chose to ignore the SBA Regulations that the parties agreed would govern their agreement because the  
 17 Arbitrator did not agree that the regulations were fair to Womply. Benworth first describes the  
 18 information that must be included in a PPP loan application along with the documents that must  
 19 accompany the application. *See infra* Part I.A.1. Benworth next surveys the undisputed facts establishing  
 20 that Womply used the Technology Services to prepare and refer PPP loan applications. *See infra* Part  
 21 I.A.2. Finally, Benworth explains how, despite these undisputed, legally dispositive facts, the Arbitrator  
 22 manifestly disregarded the law by failing to apply the Agent Fee Cap to the Technology Fees. *See infra*  
 23 Part I.A.3.

24 **1. The PPP loan application requirements.**

25 The Interim Final Rule established the requirements for submitting a PPP loan application. PPP  
 26 loan applicants were required to provide various categories of information and documents substantiating  
 27  
 28

1 that information.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, applicants were required to “submit Paycheck Protection Program  
 2 Borrower Application Form (SBA Form 2483), or lender’s equivalent form, and payroll documentation,  
 3 as described” in the Interim Final Rule. (App. 3860, art. III.B.10.)<sup>7</sup> Each category of information and  
 4 payroll documentation is addressed below.

5 **Borrower Identification Information.** PPP applicants were first required to provide  
 6 identification and contact information, including their name, social security number, address, phone  
 7 number, and email address:

<b>Check One:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Sole proprietor <input type="checkbox"/> Partnership <input type="checkbox"/> C-Corp <input type="checkbox"/> S-Corp <input type="checkbox"/> LLC <input type="checkbox"/> Independent contractor <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed individual <input type="checkbox"/> 501(c)(3) nonprofit <input type="checkbox"/> 501(c)(6) organization <input type="checkbox"/> 501(c)(19) veterans organization <input type="checkbox"/> Other 501(c) organization <input type="checkbox"/> Housing cooperative <input type="checkbox"/> Tribal business <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<b>DBA or Tradename (if applicable)</b>	<b>Year of Establishment (if applicable)</b>	
<b>Business Legal Name</b>		<b>NAICS Code</b>	<b>Applicant (including affiliates, if applicable) Meets Size Standard (check one):</b>
			<input type="checkbox"/> No more than 500 employees (or 300 employees, if applicable) unless “per location” exception applies <input type="checkbox"/> SBA industry size standards <input type="checkbox"/> SBA alternative size standard
<b>Business Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code - No P.O. Box addresses allowed)</b>		<b>Business TIN (EIN, SSN, ITIN)</b>	<b>Business Phone</b>
		<b>Primary Contact</b>	<b>Email Address</b>

17 (App. 3960; *see also* App. 3967; App. 3133-34; App. 3860, art. III.B.10.)

23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
<sup>6</sup> The Interim Final Rule enumerated specific PPP loan application requirements based on the nature of the borrower (i.e., whether the borrower was a corporation or individual). It is undisputed that all PPP borrowers who applied through Fast Lane had no employees and were self-employed individuals, independent contractors, or sole proprietors. Accordingly, this section discusses only the PPP loan application requirements that applied specifically to self-employed individuals, independent contractors, and sole proprietors.

<sup>7</sup> The parties jointly admitted into evidence copies of SBA Form 2483 for first and second draw PPP loan applications. (See generally App. 3960-66; App. 3967-73.)

1                   **Financial Criteria.** PPP applicants were next required to provide financial information,  
 2 including their average monthly payroll, the requested loan amount, and purpose(s) of the PPP loan:

Average Monthly Payroll:	\$	$\times 2.5 + EIDL$ (Do Not Include Any EIDL Advance) equals Loan Request Amount:	\$	Number of Employees:	
Purpose of the loan (select all that apply):	<input type="checkbox"/> Payroll Costs	<input type="checkbox"/> Rent / Mortgage Interest	<input type="checkbox"/> Utilities	<input type="checkbox"/> Covered Operations Expenditures	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Covered Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Covered Supplier Costs	<input type="checkbox"/> Covered Worker Protection Expenditures	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (explain):	

7 (App. 3960; *see also* App. 3967; App. 3134; App. 3856, art. III.B.4.b.)

8                   **Bank Records.** The Interim Final Rule required PPP applicants to submit banking records for  
 9 two purposes. First, applicants were required to provide documentation from 2019 or 2020, such as a  
 10 “bank statement,” to establish that they were “self-employed.” (App. 3856, art. III.B.4.b.) Second,  
 11 applicants were required to “provide a 2020 invoice, bank statement, or book of record to establish [they]  
 12 were in operation on or around February 15, 2020.” (*Id.*)

13                   **Tax Documents.** The Interim Final Rule states that applicants “must provide the 2019 or 2020  
 14 (whichever [they] used to calculate loan amount) Form 1040 Schedule C with [their] PPP loan  
 15 application to substantiate the applied-for PPP loan amount . . . .” (App. 3856, art. III.B.4.b.) Moreover,  
 16 PPP applicants were also required to certify the following with respect to the tax documents that must  
 17 accompany their PPP loan application:

18                   I acknowledge that the Lender will confirm the eligible loan amount ***using required  
 19 documents submitted.*** I understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Lender can share  
 20 any tax information that I have provided with SBA’s authorized representatives, including  
 21 authorized representatives of the SBA Office of Inspector General, for the purpose of  
 22 compliance with SBA Loan Program Requirements and all SBA Reviews.

23                   (App. 3963 (emphasis added); *see also* App. 3970; App. 3861, art. III.B.12.x.)

1                   **Eligibility Questions.** PPP applicants were also required to answer “yes” or “no” to multiple  
 2 questions that determined their eligibility for a PPP loan:

3                   *If questions (1), (2), (5), or (6) are answered “Yes,” the loan will not be approved.*

Question	Yes	No
1. Is the Applicant or any owner of the Applicant presently suspended, debarred, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, voluntarily excluded from participation in this transaction by any Federal department or agency, or presently involved in any bankruptcy?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the Applicant, any owner of the Applicant, or any business owned or controlled by any of them, ever obtained a direct or guaranteed loan from SBA or any other Federal agency (other than a Federal student loan made or guaranteed through a program administered by the Department of Education) that is (a) currently delinquent, or (b) has defaulted in the last 7 years and caused a loss to the government?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Is the Applicant or any owner of the Applicant an owner of any other business, or have common management (including a management agreement) with any other business? If yes, list all such businesses (including their TINs if available) and describe the relationship on a separate sheet identified as addendum A.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the Applicant receive an SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loan between January 31, 2020 and April 3, 2020? If yes, provide details on a separate sheet identified as addendum B.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Is the Applicant (if an individual) or any individual owning 20% or more of the equity of the Applicant presently incarcerated or, for any felony, presently subject to an indictment, criminal information, arraignment, or other means by which formal criminal charges are brought in any jurisdiction?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Initial here to confirm your response to question 5 → _____		
6. Within the last 5 years, for any felony involving fraud, bribery, embezzlement, or a false statement in a loan application or an application for federal financial assistance, has the Applicant (if an individual) or any owner of the Applicant 1) been convicted; 2) pleaded guilty; 3) pleaded nolo contendere; or 4) commenced any form of parole or probation (including probation before judgment)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Initial here to confirm your response to question 6 → _____		

13                   (App. 3961; *see also* App. 3968; App. 3133-34; App. 3860, art. III.B.10.)

14                   **PPP Certifications.** The Interim Final Rule further directed that applicants “must certify in good  
 15 faith” to various attestations concerning, *inter alia*, the accuracy of the information provided in, and the  
 16 documentation accompanying, the PPP loan application:

17                   The authorized representative of the Applicant must certify in good faith to all of the below by initialing next to each one:

- \_\_\_\_ The Applicant was in operation on February 15, 2020, has not permanently closed, and was either an eligible self-employed individual, independent contractor, or sole proprietorship with no employees, or had employees for whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes or paid independent contractors, as reported on Form(s) 1099-MISC.
- \_\_\_\_ Current economic uncertainty makes this loan request necessary to support the ongoing operations of the Applicant.
- \_\_\_\_ The funds will be used to retain workers and maintain payroll; or make payments for mortgage interest, rent, utilities, covered operations expenditures, covered property damage costs, covered supplier costs, and covered worker protection expenditures as specified under the Paycheck Protection Program Rules; I understand that if the funds are knowingly used for unauthorized purposes, the federal government may hold me legally liable, such as for charges of fraud.
- \_\_\_\_ I understand that loan forgiveness will be provided for the sum of documented payroll costs, covered mortgage interest payments, covered rent payments, covered utilities, covered operations expenditures, covered property damage costs, covered supplier costs, and covered worker protection expenditures, and not more than 40% of the forgiven amount may be for non-payroll costs. If required, the Applicant will provide to the Lender and/or SBA documentation verifying the number of full-time equivalent employees on the Applicant's payroll as well as the dollar amounts of eligible expenses for the covered period following this loan.
- \_\_\_\_ The Applicant has not and will not receive another loan under the Paycheck Protection Program, section 7(a)(36) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a)(36)) (this does not include Paycheck Protection Program second draw loans, section 7(a)(37) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)).
- \_\_\_\_ The Applicant has not been approved for a Shuttered Venue Operator (SVO) grant from SBA as of the date of this loan application, and the Applicant acknowledges that if the Applicant is approved for an SVO grant before SBA issues a loan number for this loan, the Applicant is ineligible for the loan and acceptance of any loan proceeds will be considered an unauthorized use.
- \_\_\_\_ The President, the Vice President, the head of an Executive department, or a Member of Congress, or the spouse of such person as determined under applicable common law, does not directly or indirectly hold a controlling interest in the Applicant, with such terms having the meanings provided in Section 322 of the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act.
- \_\_\_\_ The Applicant is not an issuer, the securities of which are listed on an exchange registered as a national securities exchange under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78f).

28                   (App. 3962-63; *see also* App. 3969-70; App. 3133-34; App. 3861, art. III.B.12.)

1       **KYC/BSA/AML Compliance.** PPP loan applications could be submitted to the SBA only *after*  
 2 the information in the application is verified. For example, the PPP applicant's identifying information,  
 3 such as date of birth, address, and taxpayer identification number, must be verified to confirm the  
 4 applicant's identity. (App. 3864, art. III.C.3.d.ii.)

5           **2. Womply's technology assisted in preparing and referring PPP loan**  
 6 **applications.**

7       As the Arbitrator admitted, there was no dispute that Womply's technology assisted in preparing  
 8 and referring PPP loan applications. Womply's own witnesses and documents established that most of  
 9 the Technology Services were used to collect, analyze, and verify the information and supporting  
 10 documents required by the Interim Final Rule to submit a PPP loan application. The Technology  
 11 Services "were performed using technology from third-party service providers that were linked to or  
 12 integrated into Womply's technology platform[.]" (App. 3135.) The Technology Services identified in  
 13 the Order Form include Plaid, DocuSign, LexisNexis, Inscribe, Ocrolus, Mindee, Persona, Twilio, and  
 14 Sendgrid. (App. 3987, § 1.2.) Each of these technologies were used in connection with preparing PPP  
 15 loan applications and referring PPP loan application packages to Benworth.

16       **Borrower Identity Information.** Fast Lane prompted applicants to enter their email addresses,  
 17 phone numbers, and physical addresses, which would later be populated into the PPP application form.  
 18 (App. 3134.) Womply verified email addresses using SendGrid, phone numbers using Twilio, and the  
 19 existence of physical addresses using Google Maps. (App. 3135.) [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]


21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24       **Financial Criteria.** [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]



**Applicants can choose to receive one or two loans.**


**Loan amounts are calculated automatically using NAICS and other tax details.**

(App. 3888 ( [REDACTED] ); App. 847:7-23  
( [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ).)

1 **Bank Records.** Womply also allowed applicants to connect their bank accounts to Fast Lane.

2 (App. 850:3-6.) Womply [REDACTED].

3 (App. 3997, ¶ 18(g).)



14 (App. 4015.) [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 **Tax Documents.** [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]


24 [REDACTED]

25

26

27

28



9 (App. 4016.) [REDACTED]


10 [REDACTED] (App. 3887.) [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] (See App. 843:12-19; App. 4020;

12 App. 3888.)

13 **Eligibility Questions.** [REDACTED]


22 **PPP Certifications.** [REDACTED]



**All certifications are clearly presented to the applicant.**

Our collection of this info at this stage is primarily for routing purposes. If the applicant cannot confirm the necessary answers they may still be eligible for PPP. They may choose to exit and cancel their application or to apply without Fast Lane. If they Confirm, then they will need to read, initial, and certify all questions on their application before their application is submitted to SBA.

(App. 3885-86 ( [REDACTED] ); App. 1214:25 – 1216:9; App. 981:10-21; App. 4001 (4:09:00 to 6:47:00.) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



19 (App.

4017;

20 App. 1145:13-21; App. 1230:15 – 1231:1; App. 970:9-13.)

21 KYC/BSA/AML Compliance. [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

26 [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED]

28 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

6       **3. The Arbitrator failed to recognize undisputed, legally dispositive facts.**

7       Although manifest disregard of the facts is not an independent ground for vacatur, when “legally  
8 dispositive facts are so firmly established . . . an arbitrator cannot fail to recognize them without  
9 manifestly disregarding the law.” *Coutee v. Barington Cap. Grp., L.P.*, 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.  
10 2003) (citing *Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 682 F.2d 1280, 1284–86 (9th Cir. 1982),  
11 cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983)). The Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law here because he  
12 failed to recognize the undisputed, legally dispositive facts firmly establishing that the Technology  
13 Services, whether in whole or in part, were performed to assist “in preparing an application for a PPP  
14 loan (including referral to the lender).” (App. 3865, art. III.D.4.)

15       The Final Award provided three categories of reasons to justify the Arbitrator’s failure to apply  
16 the Agent Fee Cap to the Technology Fees: (1) the unreported decision denying a motion to dismiss in  
17 *OTO Analytics, Inc. v. Capital Plus Financial, LLC*, 2022 WL 1488441 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2022)  
18 foreclosed Benworth’s arguments; (2) the Technology Fees compensated Womply for services separate  
19 and distinct from referral services; and (3) “extrinsic evidence” and the terms of the Agreements support  
20 disregarding the Agent Fee Cap. None of these reasons excuse the Arbitrator’s failure to recognize the  
21 undisputed, legally dispositive facts.

22           **i. *Capital Plus* does not foreclose applying the Agent Fee Cap to the  
23 Technology Fees.**

24       Citing *Capital Plus*, the Arbitrator ruled that “Benworth’s argument that Womply’s Technology  
25 Fees violate the [] Agent Fee Cap has already been rejected by a federal court” and “forecloses”  
26 application of the Agent Fee Cap to the Technology Fees here. (App. 3151.) But *Capital Plus* said no  
27 such thing. Nor does the decision carry the precedential value ascribed to it by the Arbitrator. And even  
28 if it did, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law because the Final Award, while relying on *Capital*

1 *Plus*, “interpreted [the decision] in a way to render” its interpretation of the Agent Fee Cap “inapplicable  
 2 to this case.” *Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates*, 553 F.3d 1277, 1293 (9th Cir. 2009).

3 *Capital Plus* is a Texas district court decision resolving a motion to dismiss. In *Capital Plus*,  
 4 Womply sued another SBA lender (Capital Plus) for unpaid PPP fees. *Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441  
 5 at \*2. Womply did not directly contract with Capital Plus; instead Womply and Blueacorn (a company  
 6 that separately contracted with Capital Plus) entered into a referral agreement and a developer order  
 7 form. *Id.* at \*2; *see also id.* at \*7. Under the developer order form, “Womply agreed to provide tax  
 8 documents, bank data, identity and account verification, and access to the PPP Portfolio Management  
 9 System.” *Id.* at \*9. And under the referral agreement, “Womply verified the email, phone number,  
 10 required information for the SBA form, business activity, tax documents, identity, bank account and  
 11 limits, absence of fraud, and lack of duplicate applications[,]” *id.*—the same services Womply provided  
 12 under the Order Form here, *see supra*, Part I.A.2.

13 To resolve Capital Plus’s motion to dismiss, based solely on Womply’s allegations, the Texas  
 14 district court had to make three determinations: (1) “whether Womply is an ‘agent’ as defined by SBA  
 15 regulations,” (2) whether Womply could recover fees from Capital Plus under a breach of contract  
 16 theory, and (3) whether the Agent Fee Cap precludes “recovery for Technology Fees.” *Capital Plus*,  
 17 2022 WL 1488441 at \*3. The Arbitrator relied solely on the Texas district court’s determination on the  
 18 third issue, which construed the allegations of the complaint in Womply’s favor, while ignoring the  
 19 analysis of the first two issues, which interpret the SBA regulations in a way that is contrary to Womply’s  
 20 position. To demonstrate the Arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law, Benworth details the Texas  
 21 district court’s analysis of all three issues.

22 The Texas district court first determined that Womply was an “agent” under SBA regulations  
 23 because Womply qualified as “any other person representing an Applicant or Participant by conducting  
 24 business with SBA.” *Id.* at \*6.<sup>8</sup> The court held that Womply represented PPP loan applicants because,

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25  
 26 <sup>8</sup> SBA regulations define an “Agent” as “an authorized representative, including an attorney, accountant,  
 27 consultant, packager, lender service provider, or **any other person representing an Applicant or  
 Participant by conducting business with SBA.**” 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(a) (emphasis added). And the term  
 28 “conduct business with the SBA” is defined to include “[p]reparing or submitting on behalf of an  
 applicant an application for financial assistance of any kind . . . .” *Id.* at § 103.1(b)(1). Based on the

1 “[d]uring the application process, Womply compiled documents that Applicants provided and verified  
 2 certain information before sending the applications to Blueacorn.” *Id.* at \*6. The court next held that  
 3 Womply conducted business with the SBA because it prepared PPP loan applications. *Id.* In determining  
 4 that Womply “prepared” PPP loan applications, the Texas district court looked to the Oxford English  
 5 Dictionary definition of “prepare” because that term was not defined in SBA regulations. *Id.* According  
 6 to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term “prepare” means “to bring into a suitable condition for some  
 7 future action or purpose; to make ready in advance; to fit out, equip.” *Id.* (cleaned up). Adopting that  
 8 definition, the court concluded that “Womply’s actions during the initial application phase” meet the  
 9 definition of “prepare” because “Womply ‘brought into a suitable condition for some future action or  
 10 purpose’ or ‘made ready’ applications for approval by Blueacorn and Capital Plus *by verifying*  
 11 *information to prevent fraud.*” *Id.* (cleaned up; emphasis added).

12 Having determined that Womply was an “agent” according to SBA regulations, the Texas district  
 13 court next dismissed Womply’s breach of contract claim against Capital Plus. *Id.* at \*7. The court  
 14 explained that SBA regulations require an agent and lender to execute and provide to the SBA the  
 15 applicable compensation agreement and, more specifically, SBA Form 159. *Id.* (citing 13 C.F.R. §  
 16 103.5(a)). Not only was there no contract between Womply and Capital Plus, but they also “did not  
 17 submit Form 159 to the SBA and courts uniformly hold this precludes any recovery of SBA Fees.” *Id.*  
 18 As discussed below, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded this SBA regulation when he ruled that  
 19 Womply is entitled to additional fees from Benworth under agreements that were not submitted to the  
 20 SBA. *See infra*, Part I.C.

21 Finally, the Texas district court held that, “[b]ased on the information before the Court *at this*  
 22 *stage of litigation*, the Court does not find the SBA regulation *clearly* precludes the collection of a  
 23 Technology Fee.” *Id.* at \*10 (emphases added). Of course, because *Capital Plus* was decided at the  
 24 motion to dismiss stage, the only information before the court was Womply’s allegations and copies of  
 25

26 arguments advanced by the defendants in *Capital Plus*, which did not include the argument that Womply  
 27 is a lender service provider, the Texas district court focused on whether Womply qualified as “any other  
 28 person representing an Applicant or Participant by conducting business with the SBA.” *See Capital Plus*,  
 2022 WL 1488441 at \*5-6.

1 the agreements, which the court was required to construe in Womply’s favor. Based on that information,  
 2 the court found that the referral fees and technology fees were for separate services because they were  
 3 set forth in separate agreements. *Id.* at \* 9. The court then concluded that, under the developer order  
 4 form, “the services provided by Womply—providing tax documents, bank data, identity and account  
 5 verification—*do not directly relate to a PPP loan application so these services do not prepare, or make*  
 6 *ready, a PPP loan application for submission to the SBA.*” *Id.* at \*10 (emphasis added).

7 The Arbitrator ascribed more weight to *Capital Plus*’s application of the Agent Fee Cap than it  
 8 can carry. The district court’s conclusion regarding Womply’s technology fees was not based on an  
 9 analysis of PPP loan application requirements or an examination of Womply’s technology services. *See*  
 10 *id.* The district court simply—as it was required to do—accepted Womply’s allegations as true: that  
 11 Womply’s technology services were unrelated with preparing or referring PPP loan applications. *See id.*  
 12 That is evident by, again, the district court’s caveat that, “[b]ased on the information before the Court *at*  
 13 *this stage of litigation*, the Court does not find the SBA regulation *clearly* precludes the collection of a  
 14 Technology Fee.” *Id.* (emphases added). The district court in *Capital Plus* thus left open the possibility  
 15 that discovery would reveal additional information about the services Womply provided under the order  
 16 form that may have resulted in the Agent Fee Cap precluding recovery of technology fees.

17 Such additional information was presented to the Arbitrator here. *See supra*, Part I.A.2; *see also*  
 18 *infra*, Part I.A.3.ii. After being presented with that information, the Arbitrator [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED]. (App. 2776:15-18.) However, in a puzzling turn,  
 20 the Arbitrator selectively adopted elements of the *Capital Plus* decision that was predicated on the  
 21 opposite factual scenario, which the district court had to assume to be true.<sup>9</sup> (App. 3148, 3151.) And the  
 22 Arbitrator ignored other aspects of *Capital Plus* that were harmful to Womply—i.e., that Womply was  
 23  
 24

25 <sup>9</sup> For example, *Capital Plus* stated that the service of providing tax documents and bank data do not  
 26 relate to a PPP loan application. 2022 WL 1488441, at \*10. But in the Arbitration, even Womply’s  
 27 witnesses admitted facts that contradict the allegations the district court had to accept as true in ruling  
 28 on the motion to dismiss. (*See, e.g.*, App. 1222:13-24 [REDACTED]; *see also id.*  
 at 648:14-23 [REDACTED].) [REDACTED].)

1 an “Agent” under the plain reading of SBA Regulations, a legal determination. *Compare* (App. 3147-  
 2 48, 3151 *with Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441 at \*6-7.)

3 At bottom, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by interpreting *Capital Plus* “in a way  
 4 to render it inapplicable to this case.” *Comedy Club*, 553 F.3d at 1293. The Ninth Circuit partially  
 5 vacated an arbitral award for a similar reason in *Comedy Club*. In *Comedy Club*, the district court  
 6 confirmed an arbitral award ruling, among other things, that a covenant not to compete was valid under  
 7 California Business and Professions Code §16600. *Id.* at 1282-83. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that  
 8 the arbitrator’s ruling “ignores CBPC §16600 and thus is in manifest disregard of the law.” *Id.* at 1293.  
 9 The Ninth Circuit explained that the arbitrator acknowledged but disregarded a California case  
 10 interpreting §16600 (*Dayton Time Lock*), holding that such covenants may be invalid under California  
 11 law. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit rejected the arbitrator’s “fundamentally incorrect” reasons for disregarding  
 12 *Dayton Time Lock*. *Id.* Given the arbitrator’s awareness of *Dayton Time Lock*, coupled with the plain  
 13 language of the opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that “it was not in the province of the arbitrator to make  
 14 a ‘ruling’ about § 16600 that was so at odds with what the California Court of Appeal stated in *Dayton*  
 15 *Time Lock*.” *Id.* at 1293, n.17. The same reasoning applies here.

16 *Comedy Club* likewise supports vacatur here. Although the Arbitrator ostensibly applied *Capital*  
 17 *Plus*, his ruling about the scope of the Agent Fee Cap is so at odds with what was stated in the decision  
 18 as well as the plain and express reading of the SBA Regulations. Relying on *Capital Plus*, the Arbitrator  
 19 wrote that the Agent Fee Cap “limits the fee for preparing an application for a PPP loan, but not for any  
 20 other reason,’ and the fees Womply received for providing technology and other services are not subject  
 21 to the Agent Fee Cap because they ‘do not directly relate to a PPP loan application.’” (App. 3151  
 22 (quoting *Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441 at \*10.) But, as discussed above, that holding in *Capital Plus*  
 23 was premised on an assumption of facts the Arbitrator himself acknowledged did not exist in the present  
 24 case. (App. 2776:15-18.) The Arbitrator also blithely ignored *Capital Plus*’s legal analysis that broadly  
 25 defined the term “preparing” in reference to PPP loans under the SBA Regulations that adopted the  
 26 Agent Fee Cap. *Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441 at \*6 (holding that to “prepare” means to “make  
 27 ready”). The Arbitrator’s ruling that none of the Technology Services ‘made ready’ a PPP loan ignores  
 28 not only the holding of *Capital Plus* but the plain reading of SBA Regulations. This Court should vacate

1 the Final Award because it “ignores [*Capital Plus* as well as the Agent Fee Cap] and thus is in manifest  
 2 disregard of the law.” *Comedy Club*, 553 F.3d at 1293.

3 **ii. The Arbitrator admitted that the Technology Services assisted in  
 4 preparing and referring PPP loan applications.**

5 The Arbitrator also concluded that “the evidence introduced at the Hearing was clear that the  
 6 substance of Womply’s Technology Services was, in fact, different from Womply’s referral services,  
 7 and more specifically, the evidence proved that the Technology Services served the purpose of  
 8 benefitting Benworth in accomplishing its underwriting functions as a lender under the SBA  
 9 regulations.” (App. 3148-50.)

10 However, the undisputed facts, the Arbitrator’s own statements during closing arguments, and  
 11 the findings in the Final Award all establish that the Technology Services related to preparing, or making  
 12 ready, a PPP loan application—not exclusively underwriting. Except as to Teslar (which Benworth  
 13 conceded was not subject to the Agent Fee Cap), Womply’s witnesses, its videos, and its other  
 14 documents established that Womply’s Technology Services made ready PPP loan applications that were  
 15 then submitted (or referred) to Benworth. *See supra*, Part I.A.2; *compare id.* (detailing how Womply’s  
 16 technology assisted in preparing PPP loan applications including by deploying identity verification and  
 17 other fraud prevention measures) *with Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441 at \*6 (explaining that Womply  
 18 “made ready” PPP loan applications for approval by a lender “by verifying information to prevent  
 19 fraud”). Again, incomplete applications—or those that were not eligible for PPP—were never filtered  
 20 to lenders like Benworth. *See supra*, Part I.A.2. The Arbitrator also agreed [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]  
 22 [REDACTED]. (App. 2776:15-18.) And the  
 23 Final Award characterizes the Referral Fee as payment “for applicant information collection and referral  
 24 services[,]” (App. 3131), while also finding that Womply’s Technology Services “***allowed a prospective  
 25 applicant to enter the necessary information to populate the SBA required application form for a PPP  
 26 loan*** and to provide the documentation or certifications lenders used to evaluate each application[,]”

1 (App. 3133-34 (emphasis added) (explaining also that the information that Womply's technology  
 2 gathered was required by SBA rules to submit a PPP loan)).<sup>10</sup>

3 There is no way to reconcile the foregoing with the Final Award's conclusory statement that the  
 4 Technology Services were principally related to underwriting, not preparing and referring PPP loans.  
 5 The SBA eliminated traditional underwriting for PPP loans. *See supra* pp. 8-9. Rather than assessing an  
 6 applicant's creditworthiness, *id.*, the SBA simply required applicants to attest to the accuracy of certain  
 7 statements, the attestations of which were a component of the PPP application. *See supra* Part I.A.1.  
 8 Acquiring the attestations thus was a part of making ready a PPP application. Underwriting also included  
 9 certain borrower verification analysis, *see infra* Part I.B.2, which Womply's Technology Services  
 10 indisputably deployed. The undisputed evidence at trial, however, showed that during PPP, Benworth  
 11 never received underlying documents related to borrower verification. (App. 2594.) Womply deployed  
 12 those verification tools to determine which loans it would refer to lenders like Benworth. *See supra* Part  
 13 I.A.2. Even here, Womply's technology was deployed to prepare or refer PPP loans. Yet, the Arbitrator  
 14 did not treat any portion of the Technology Fees as subject to the Agent Fee Cap. As became thematic  
 15 in the Final Award, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law and the parties' Agreements to reach  
 16 a predetermined conclusion in favor of Womply.

17 *American Postal* demonstrates why this Court should disregard the Arbitrator's conclusion that  
 18 the Agent Fee Cap does not apply to the Technology Fees and vacate the Final Award. In *American*  
 19 *Postal*, the Ninth Circuit vacated an arbitration award that required the U.S. Postal Service to reinstate  
 20 a former employee. The arbitrator awarded reinstatement based on the former employee's erroneous  
 21 belief that his picketing activities were sanctioned by the union. However, “[b]y statute, a worker may  
 22 not hold a government position if the individual has participated in a strike against the government.”

23  
 24 <sup>10</sup> For reference, the Arbitrator's quoted statement above—i.e., that Womply's technology was used to  
 25 “provide the documentation or certifications lenders used to evaluate each application”—was also at  
 odds with the undisputed facts. *Id.* at 23.

26 (App. 2594.) As for certifications, those were a part of PPP application itself, and there was  
 27 nothing for lenders to evaluate: either applicants made the certifications, or they did not.

28 (App. 1214:25 – 1216:9; App. 981:10-21; App. 4001 (4:09:00 to 6:47:00); App. 3885-86.)

1 *American Postal*, 682 F.2d at 1283 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7311). The arbitrator’s award included findings  
 2 demonstrating that the former employee participated in a strike. *Id.* In support of vacating the award, the  
 3 court found it was “not necessary for an arbitrator to state the precise words that an employee  
 4 ‘participates in a strike’ in order to conclude that his employment would violate section 7311.” *Id.*

5 In declining to remand the matter to the arbitrator, the court emphasized that the arbitration did  
 6 not merely involve a dispute between private parties:

7 This case requires more than the resolution of the competing interests of two opposing  
 8 private parties. It also requires an adjudication of the coverage and application of a federal  
 9 law passed by Congress to insure a stable work force for the government and agencies of  
 10 the United States. We therefore cannot treat the issues raised by this dispute merely as  
 11 matters of conflict between an employer and its employees. *In light of the undisputed*  
 12 *facts of this case, we could not confirm an award of arbitration simply because the*  
 13 *arbitrator stated that Murphy did not strike. To confirm such an award in this case*  
 14 *would be to confer upon the arbitrator unreviewable power to construe and apply*  
 15 *section 7311.* In his original decision, the arbitrator concluded that the penalty of  
 16 discharge was too severe a sanction because Murphy was young, misinformed, and  
 17 potentially valuable as an employee. The choice of sanctions, however, is not arbitrable;  
 18 that choice has already been made by Congress. *We cannot empower the arbitrator to*  
 19 *nullify the mandates of Congress simply by stating that an individual did not strike*  
 20 *when, as here, his actions, as presented in undisputed facts, constitute a strike for*  
 21 *purposes of the section.*

22 *Id.* at 1285 (emphases added). Like in *American Postal*, this Court cannot accept the Arbitrator’s  
 23 conclusion that the Agent Fee Cap does not apply at all to the Technology Fees by simply stating that  
 24 the Technology Services did not constitute preparing and referring PPP loan applications when, as here,  
 25 the Technology Services, as presented in undisputed facts, constitute services that prepared and made  
 26 ready a PPP loan application for submission to the SBA. *See supra*, Part I.A.2.

### 27                   iii. The Agent Fee Cap controls over conflicting terms in the Agreements.

28 Finally, the Arbitrator attempted to disguise his disregard of the SBA-imposed Agent Fee Cap  
 29 by pointing to *some* of the terms of the Agreements and “extrinsic evidence” that, according to the  
 30 Arbitrator, was “not necessary” to the issue. (App. 3147-48, 3151-52.) Specifically, the Arbitrator  
 31 concluded that “the parties clearly perceived [the referral services, API services, and Technology  
 32 Services] to be different at the time of contracting since they were enumerated separately in different  
 33 contracts and each service had a different formula for fees.” (App. 3147.) As for the extrinsic evidence,

1 the Arbitrator relied on Benworth “calculating and paying Womply’s fees based on the three distinct  
 2 formulae in the parties’ Agreements.” (App. 3151-52.)

3 The Arbitrator ineffectually relied on “extrinsic evidence” and some of the terms of the  
 4 Agreements to justify charging Benworth in excess of 1% for services that he had admitted [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED] (App. 2775:19.) As noted above, the  
 6 Parties incorporated the SBA Regulations into the Agreements and, further, granted those provisions  
 7 precedence over anything else. (See App. 3984, § 9 (“*Notwithstanding . . . any provision of this*  
 8 *Agreement to the contrary, this Agreement is subject to all Applicable Laws, including SBA*  
 9 *Regulations.*” (emphasis added); App. 3988, § 4 (same).) The Arbitrator was not permitted to disregard  
 10 that rule and apply a rough sense of justice and ignore (or downgrade) provisions of the Agreements the  
 11 Parties agreed would take precedence. *See Pacific Motor*, 702 F.2d at 177 (“The arbitrator disregarded  
 12 a specific contract provision to correct what he perceived as an injustice. Although an arbitrator has  
 13 great freedom in determining an award, he may not dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”).  
 14 Otherwise, this Court would “confer upon the arbitrator unreviewable power to construe and apply” the  
 15 Agent Fee Cap and “empower the arbitrator to nullify the mandates of” the SBA. *See American Postal*,  
 16 682 F.2d at 1285. The Arbitrator thus decided that he would not apply SBA Regulations that clearly do  
 17 apply to the Technology Fees because of purportedly contradicting provisions in the Agreements that  
 18 the parties adhered to. But the Agreements specified that the SBA Regulations would control—not the  
 19 provisions of the Agreements Womply drafted.<sup>11</sup>

20  
 21 <sup>11</sup> In both his analysis of the Agent Fee Cap and of the provisions relating to lender service providers, the  
 22 Arbitrator cabined discussion of those issues exclusively when considering Benworth’s affirmative  
 23 defense of illegality. (See, e.g., App. 3156-58.); *see also infra* pp. 59-60 (discussing such an instance).  
 24 The Arbitrator thus refused to consider these SBA Regulations as provisions that were part and parcel of  
 25 the parties’ Agreements as they were intended. (App. 3984, § 9; App. 3988, § 4.) The Arbitrator  
 26 impermissibly used that “illegality” framework to disregard not only the Agreements he swore to  
 27 faithfully apply but also the federal regulations that he has no power to abrogate. (See, e.g., App. 3156-  
 28 57 (acknowledging that the SBA Regulations prohibit compensation to lender service providers under  
 agreements that the SBA does not approve, but claiming that the Arbitrator could avoid applying that  
 prohibition under certain exceptions recognized in reference to illegality affirmative defenses).) This  
 Court should vacate for that reason as well. The Arbitrator plainly refused to enforce the Agreements as  
 written.

1                   **B.       The Arbitrator Manifestly Disregarded The Law When He Admittedly Refused To**  
 2                   **Apply The Controlling SOPs.**

3                   The Final Award reflects that the Arbitrator understood “it is not” his “role to decide what is  
 4                   ‘fair;’ he is instead merely tasked with interpreting the contract provisions.” (App. 3165.) One such  
 5                   contract provision the Arbitrator was tasked with interpreting was the SOPs’ clause on compensating  
 6                   lender service providers (which, again, the Parties expressly incorporated into their Agreements, *see*  
 7                   *supra*, p. 15): “An LSP may only receive compensation from the 7(a) Lender for services provided under  
 8                   an SBA-reviewed LSP Agreement.” (App. 3442.)

9                   Prior to issuing the Interim Award, the Arbitrator announced his interpretation of the provision:  
 10                   [REDACTED]  
 11                   [REDACTED]  
 12                   [REDACTED]    But the Arbitrator believed that enforcing this provision “would result in a  
 13                   disproportionately harsh penalty” to Womply. (App. 3158.) So, the Arbitrator concocted an array of  
 14                   implausible justifications to conclude that Womply was not a lender service provider subject to the  
 15                   SOPs’ condition precedent to compensation.

16                   SBA regulations define a lender service provider as “an Agent who carries out lender functions  
 17                   in originating, disbursing, servicing, or liquidating a specific SBA business loan or loan portfolio for  
 18                   compensation from the lender.” 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(d). In the SOPs, the SBA clarified the meaning of  
 19                   “lender service provider” by enumerating a non-exhaustive list of “examples of when SBA considers an  
 20                   Agent to meet the definition of an LSP [, i.e., a lender service provider].” (App. 3442, § 6(e).) Those  
 21                   examples include:

22                   i.       An individual or entity engaged by a 7(a) Lender to provide services for the  
 23                   purposes of obtaining Federal financial assistance that include interaction with the Applicant  
 24                   either in person ***or through the use of technology***, to request or obtain eligibility and/or financial  
 25                   information that will be provided to the 7(a) Lender. This includes Agents who:

26                   a) Perform any pre-qualification review based on SBA’s eligibility and credit criteria  
 27                   . . . prior to submitting the Applicant’s information to the 7(a) Lender; or  
 28                   b) Provide to the 7(a) Lender an underwritten application, whether through ***the use of***  
***technology or otherwise***.

29                   ii.      Entities providing technology services to a 7(a) Lender that ***include***  
***underwriting***.

iii. An individual or entity generates a significant number of 7(a) Lender's loan originations. As a general rule, SBA considers a "significant number" to be two-thirds (66%) or more of the 7(a) Lender's loan originations for the prior 12 months.

(App. 3442 (emphasis added)); *see also* (App. 3865, art. III.D.1 (“Loans will be guaranteed under the PPP under the same terms, conditions and processes as other 7(a) loans . . .”)).

Benworth argued, and the undisputed facts established, that Womply was a lender service provider under each of these examples. For example, [REDACTED]

At the very least, Womply's services to applicants constituted "pre-qualification review based on SBA's eligibility" criteria, a role assigned to lender service providers. (App. 3442, § 6(e)(i)(a)); App. 1453:21 – 1454:1; App. 3955; *see also supra* Part I.A.2.) Womply also generated ***more than 90%*** of Benworth's loan originations—much more than two-thirds. (App. 2587.)

Despite the undisputed facts firmly establishing that Womply was a lender service provider under the SOPs, the Arbitrator reached the opposite conclusion. The Arbitrator’s reasons for his award leads “inexorably to the conclusion that in his reaching his decision the arbitrator ‘dispensed his own brand of industrial justice.’” *Garvey v. Roberts*, 203 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 2000). “To understand why this decision can only be explained as an attempt by the arbitrator to dispense his own brand of industrial justice, we must review the context in which he reached his extraordinary conclusion.” *Id.*

The Arbitrator gave four reasons why he concluded that Womply is not a lender service provider: (1) Womply did not originate PPP loans; (2) Womply did not engage in underwriting; (3) the Arbitrator was not required to apply the SOPs and (4) the parties' course of conduct suggests Womply was not a lender service provider. (App. 3152-56.) None of these reasons draw their essence from the Agreements or the governing SBA Regulations.

1           **1. The Arbitrator crafted a definition of origination with the sole intent of**  
 2           **excluding Womply from the plain language of the SBA Regulations.**

3           The Arbitrator first determined that Womply was not a lender service provider because it did not  
 4           originate loans. (App. 3153.) And the Arbitrator made that determination by creating his own definition  
 5           of origination. But the parties did not give the Arbitrator the power to rewrite the SBA Regulations or  
 6           the Agreements.

7           The Arbitrator defined “originating” as “underwriting and approving a loan and submitting it to  
 8           the SBA for final approval.” (App. 3153.) It is unclear from where the Arbitrator derived that definition,  
 9           but it certainly did not come from the Agreements, the evidence, the parties’ arguments, or the ordinary  
 10          meaning of that term. In fact, not even Womply advanced such a narrow definition of origination.  
 11          During closing arguments, Womply argued [REDACTED]

12          [REDACTED] (App. 2722:15-17.) According to Womply, then, “originating” would include not  
 13          only underwriting but also collecting borrower information to prepare a PPP loan application. Benworth  
 14          agrees.

15          The parties’ interpretation of “originating” is also consistent with what the SBA views as  
 16          origination. In an SBA form Benworth was required to submit to the SBA, the SBA characterized  
 17          “Origination Activities” as “application evaluation, gathering documents, processing, etc.” (App. 3990.)  
 18          Benworth specifically brought this SBA form to the Arbitrator’s attention on multiple occasions,  
 19          including in its Response to Womply’s Post-Hearing Brief (App. 2670-71.) and in its Motion for  
 20          Reconsideration of the Interim Award (App. 2968), but the Arbitrator simply ignored this evidence from  
 21          the SBA. And Womply provided no evidence or other authority to dispute this fact. But as the Arbitrator  
 22          found in the Final Award, the evidence proved that Womply “collect[ed] data from potential applicants  
 23          to refer those applicants to Benworth.” (App. 3153.) Thus, contrary to the Arbitrator’s statement in the  
 24          Final Award, Womply’s Technology Services do “fall within even a layman’s understanding of what  
 25          origination of a loan to the SBA means.” (*Id.*) Only the Arbitrator has adopted a different view.

26          The Arbitrator’s definition of origination is also implausible because it directly conflicts with  
 27          the terms of the Agreements. *See Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors, LLC*, 268  
 28          F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[A]n award that conflicts directly with the contract cannot  
 29          be a plausible interpretation.”); *see also United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 1119, AFL-CIO v.*

1 *United Markets, Inc.*, 784 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986) (“This direct conflict with the language of  
 2 the agreement renders the arbitrator’s interpretation implausible.”). The Agreements not only  
 3 specifically defined “SBA Regulation” to include the SOPs, but the SOPs were also express terms of  
 4 the parties’ bargain because they were specifically incorporated in the Agreements. *See Serv. Emps.*,  
 5 200 Cal. App. 4th at 879 n.6 (“When language of a statute or regulations is incorporated in a contract,  
 6 such language establishes contractual rights and obligations apart from its legal identity as part of a  
 7 statute or regulation.”); *300 DeHaro St. Invs.*, 161 Cal. App. 4th at 1256 (“When statutory language is  
 8 included in a contract, it assumes a new legal identity: that of contractual language.”).

9       Multiple examples of lender service providers under the SOPs—which the Arbitrator described  
 10 as a “document containing ***policies and procedures governing the PPP[.]***” (App. 3120 (emphasis  
 11 added))—include activities that fall short of approving and submitting loans to the SBA. For instance,  
 12 an entity performing “any pre-qualification review” of an applicant’s information before submitting it  
 13 to the lender is an example of a lender service provider according to the SBA. (App. 3442.) If the  
 14 Arbitrator is correct that one must approve the loan to be a lender service provider, then the Arbitrator’s  
 15 definition of origination renders the SBA’s own example obsolete. But as the Arbitrator acknowledged,  
 16 “[i]t is a basic tenet of contract interpretation under California law that the whole of a contract is to be  
 17 taken together so as to give effect to every part, with each clause aiding in the interpretation of another,  
 18 and an interpretation giving effect to all provisions is preferred to one rendering any part of the contract  
 19 meaningless.” (App. 3147 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1641 and Cal. Civ. Code § 1858).) The Arbitrator’s  
 20 definition of origination violates these basic tenets.

21       Notwithstanding, the Final Award states that the Arbitrator’s definition of origination is  
 22 “strongly supported” by the Agreements because “Benworth contracted to pay Womply Technology  
 23 Fees ‘for each loan originated by [Benworth] under the PPP resulting from a Referral.’” (App. 3153.)  
 24 Based on that contract language, the Arbitrator found that “the parties understood and agreed that it was  
 25 Benworth that originated the loans, not Womply.” (*Id.*) But the interpretation of origination advanced  
 26 by the parties and reflected in the SBA’s form (App. 3990) gives effect to that provision as well, while  
 27 also conforming to the SBA Regulations on the matter, which were themselves incorporated in the  
 28 Agreements.

1 As stated in the Referral Agreement, Benworth has the “ultimate”—not sole—responsibility for  
 2 all loan decisions, including approvals and underwriting. (App. 3982.) Because the SBA regulations  
 3 define a lender service provider to include an “Agent who *carries out lender functions* in originating,”  
 4 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(d) (emphasis added), Womply may still be considered a lender service provider even  
 5 if it did not have the sole (or ultimate) responsibility for *all* loan decisions leading to loan originations  
 6 and instead only carried out certain lender origination functions, like underwriting. And the Arbitrator  
 7 specifically found that “Womply’s technology to some extent electronically performed the[] functions”  
 8 of underwriting a PPP loan. (App. 3154.) Despite that finding, the Arbitrator still concluded that  
 9 Womply’s technology did not include underwriting. (*Id.*) This, too, is an irrational conclusion that is  
 10 untethered to the undisputed facts and the SBA Regulations incorporated into the Agreements.

11 It is also an irrational conclusion that conflicts with the Final Award itself. Recall, in seeking to  
 12 excuse Womply from the Agent Fee Cap, the Arbitrator concluded that Womply’s Technology Services  
 13 were primarily related to underwriting, not preparing or referring PPP loans. However, when the  
 14 Arbitrator sought to excuse Womply from the applicability of provisions relating to lender service  
 15 providers, the Arbitrator denied that Womply was engaged in underwriting.

16 **2. Womply carried out lender functions in underwriting PPP loans.**

17 The Arbitrator concluded that it “was Benworth, not Womply, that was underwriting the PPP  
 18 loans” because “Benworth was required to take the information developed by the Womply technology  
 19 and make a final determination that all necessary criteria had been met before submitting a loan to the  
 20 SBA for approval.” (App. 3154.) This conclusion is irreconcilable with the plain language of the SBA  
 21 Regulations as well as the undisputed, legally dispositive facts and the findings in the Final Award.

22 First, as highlighted above, the SBA Regulations did not require that lender service providers  
 23 perform all (or the ultimate) underwriting functions. The regulations merely require that the agent “carries  
 24 out lender functions *in* originating . . .” SBA loans. 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(d) (emphasis added). The SOPs  
 25 further include examples of lender service providers who perform functions short of rendering the  
 26 ultimate underwriting decision of whether to fund a loan. (App. 3442, § 6(e)(i)(b) (defining as “lender  
 27 service providers” entities that merely provide an underwritten application to an SBA lender).) The  
 28

1 Arbitrator cannot adopt a definition of “underwriting” that would obliterate federal regulations or the  
2 terms of the parties’ Agreements that incorporate those regulations.

3 As noted above, the SBA limited the underwriting requirements for PPP loans through the Interim  
4 Final Rule. *See supra*, pp. 8-9. Under the Interim Final Rule, underwriting was limited to:

- 5 • Confirming receipt of borrower certifications contained in the borrower’s PPP application  
6 form, (App. 3863, art. III.C.3.a);
- 7 • Confirming receipt of information that a borrower had employees for whom the borrower paid  
8 salaries and payroll taxes on or around February 15, 2020, (App. 3863-64, art. III.C.3.b);
- 9 • Confirming the dollar amount of average monthly payroll costs for the preceding calendar  
10 year by reviewing payroll documentation submitted with the borrower’s application, (App.  
11 3864, art. III.C.3.c);
- 12 • Following applicable Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requirements, (App. 3864, art. III.C.3.d).

13 The Interim Final Rule further provides that “[e]ach lender’s underwriting obligation under the PPP is  
14 limited to the items listed above [i.e., in article III.C.3] and reviewing the ‘Paycheck Protection  
15 Application Form.’” (App. 3864.) The Arbitrator conceded, as he must, that “it is true that Womply’s  
16 technology to some extent electronically performed some of these functions . . . .” (App. 3154.) The  
17 undisputed facts corroborate that concession and establish that Womply performed PPP underwriting  
18 functions.

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

26 [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED]

28 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

6 The findings in the Final Award also lead to the inescapable conclusion that Womply performed  
7 underwriting. For example, the Arbitrator found that “the Technology Services served the purpose of  
8 benefitting Benworth in accomplishing its underwriting functions as a lender under the SBA regulations.”  
9 (App. 3148.) “Indeed, it is undisputed that without Womply’s Technology Services, Benworth would  
10 have had to conduct manual reviews of each PPP loan applicant’s information, making it impossible for  
11 it to have successfully processed billions of dollars in PPP loan applications.” (*Id.*) The Arbitrator also  
12 found that Womply’s technology “greatly increased the likelihood that a loan would be approved and  
13 funded . . .” (App. 3150.)

14 Like in *American Postal*, *see supra* pp. 45-46, this Court is not bound by the Arbitrator’s  
15 conclusion that Womply is not a lender service provider when the findings in the Final Award and the  
16 undisputed facts presented to the Arbitrator confirm that Womply acted as a lender service provider under  
17 the Agreements. *See also Dewan v. Walia*, 544 F. App’x 240, 248 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Accordingly, we hold  
18 that the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by holding the Release valid and enforceable but  
19 nevertheless arbitrating Walia’s counterclaims arising out of his employment with the Company.”).

20 **3. The Arbitrator’s reasoning for not applying the SOPs is inexplicable.**

21 The Arbitrator further manifestly disregarded the law by expressly declining to rely on the SBA’s  
22 examples of lender service providers. (App. 3154-55.) In the Final Award, the Arbitrator declined to  
23 apply the examples of lender service providers because the SBA included those examples in SOPs rather  
24 than a rule or the Code of Federal Regulations. (App. 3154-55.) As noted above (*see supra*, p. 15), the  
25 parties’ Agreements expressly incorporated all SBA Regulations, including those contained in SOPs.

26 The Arbitrator, however, employed “conflict of law” principles to ignore the binding SBA  
27 Regulations. Specifically, the Arbitrator stated that “when an SOP conflicts with a regulation or rule, it  
28 is the language of the regulation or rule that ultimately prevails.” (App. 3154.) That conflict of law

1 principle has no application to the SOPs' examples of lender service providers. There is no conflict  
 2 between the SOPs (which lists examples of lender service providers) and the definition of lender service  
 3 providers (contained in the Code of Federal Regulations).

4 The regulation defines a lender service provider as "an Agent who carries out lender functions in  
 5 originating, disbursing, servicing, or liquidating a specific SBA business loan or loan portfolio for  
 6 compensation from the lender." 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(d). In the SOPs, the SBA did what a federal agency  
 7 does: it put further flesh on a regulatory definition by, among other things, giving examples. That is not  
 8 a conflict. *See Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC*, 862 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying  
 9 "the familiar rule of construction that, where possible, provisions of a regulation should be read so as not  
 10 to create a conflict") (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

11 Originally, in the Interim Award, the Arbitrator failed to identify any statute or regulation that  
 12 conflicts with the SOPs' examples of a lender service provider. (App. 2944.) In its motion for  
 13 reconsideration of the Interim Award, Benworth pointed out to the Arbitrator that Womply never argued  
 14 that the SOPs' examples of lender service providers conflict with other SBA Regulations and the  
 15 Arbitrator failed to identify any conflicting SBA rule or regulation. (App. 2969.) In the order denying  
 16 reconsideration, the Arbitrator maintained that [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]  
 18 [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED]  
 20 [REDACTED]  
 21 [REDACTED] (*Id.*) The Arbitrator then incorporated these additional reasons in the Final  
 22 Award. (*Compare* App. 2944 *with* App. 3154-55.)

23 The additional reasons cited by the Arbitrator in the Final Award still amount to a manifest  
 24 disregard of the SBA Regulations (incorporated into the Agreements) for two reasons. First, the  
 25 Arbitrator omitted critical language in the SOPs' example of a lender service provider that purportedly  
 26 conflicts with other SBA regulations defining the different types of agents. Specifically, the Arbitrator  
 27 quoted the example of a lender service provider that includes an entity that "provide[s] services for the  
 28 purposes of obtaining Federal financial assistance that include[s] interaction with the Applicant either in-

1 person or through the use of technology. . . .” (App. 3155. (quoting from App. 3442) (alteration in  
 2 original).) But the Arbitrator blatantly omitted the critical language concerning the purpose of the  
 3 interaction with the applicant: “. . . to request or obtain eligibility and/or financial information that will  
 4 be provided to the 7(a) Lender.” (App. 3442.) Not every entity involved in the PPP interacted with  
 5 applicants to request or obtain eligibility and/or financial information. For example, during the first round  
 6 of PPP funding, Womply simply collected the contact information from potential borrowers, so it could  
 7 refer just that information to a lender. (*See* App. 3127.)

8 Second, and for similar reasons, the SOPs’ example of a lender service provider does not conflict  
 9 with other SBA regulations that define and differentiate between the different types of agents. Sticking  
 10 with Womply’s role during the first round of PPP funding, Womply was a “Referral Agent.” SBA  
 11 regulations define a “Referral Agent” as “a person or entity who identifies and refers an Applicant to a  
 12 lender or a lender to an Applicant. The Referral Agent may be employed and compensated by either an  
 13 Applicant or a lender.” 13 C.F.R. § 103.1(f). No conflict exists here because the entity’s status as a  
 14 Referral Agent does not require that it interact with the applicant for the purpose of obtaining eligibility  
 15 and/or financial information. And unlike a lender service provider, which is limited to an entity that  
 16 contracts with and is compensated by a lender, *id.* at § 103.1(d), the Referral Agent may be employed  
 17 and compensated by either an applicant or a lender. The same is true with respect to a “Packager”—the  
 18 only other type of agent identified in SBA regulations. *See id.* at 103.1(e) (“Packager means an Agent  
 19 who is employed and compensated by an Applicant *or* lender to prepare the Applicant’s application for  
 20 financial assistance from SBA.” (emphasis added)).

21 The Arbitrator stretched to find a means to invalidate federal regulations that were plainly  
 22 applicable to Womply’s activities. The Final Award’s summary disposal of the SOPs’ examples of lender  
 23 service providers shows that the Arbitrator never intended to apply the terms of the Agreements because  
 24 it would be inescapable that Womply is a lender service provider according to the SOPs—which the  
 25 Arbitrator conceded contains “policies and procedures **governing the PPP**” (App. 3120 (emphasis  
 26 added))—that the parties agreed would govern. The Arbitrator had no authority to disregard the SOPs  
 27 and his refusal to apply them to the undisputed facts constitutes a manifest disregard of the law that  
 28 requires vacatur. *See Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC*, 913 F.3d 1162,

1 1166-68 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming vacatur of arbitration award where the arbitrator failed to give  
 2 controlling effect to federal regulations incorporated into the parties' agreement); *see also American*  
 3 *Postal, supra* at pp. 45-46. The Final Award simply reflects the Arbitrator's disagreement with federal  
 4 regulations: believing the SBA erred in defining the entities it would regulate. The Arbitrator manifestly  
 5 disregarded the law that was incorporated into the Agreements and that he swore to apply. Neither the  
 6 parties nor Congress delegated to the Arbitrator the authority to rewrite federal regulations. *See Am.*  
 7 *Postal*, 682 F.2d at 1285. The Final Award must be vacated.

8           **4. Womply's course of conduct establishes it was a lender service provider.**

9           Finally, the Arbitrator determined that the "parties' course of conduct strongly points to the fact  
 10 that Womply was not" a lender service provider. (App. 3155.) The Arbitrator first cited the boilerplate  
 11 language Womply included in the Agreements disclaiming that it was a lender service provider. (*Id.*)  
 12 The Arbitrator also noted that the CEO of Benworth sent a letter to the SBA stating "'Womply is not an  
 13 LSP-they are an Agent.'" (*Id.* (citing JX301).) Neither fact can support the conclusion that Womply is  
 14 not a lender service provider here.

15           Again, the Agreements required the Arbitrator to give controlling effect to "SBA Regulations,"  
 16 which includes the SOPs, notwithstanding any provision of the Agreements to the contrary. (*See* App.  
 17 3988 (providing that "SBA Regulations" govern over contrary provisions of the agreement).) Beyond  
 18 that, as a matter of California law, the "label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive,  
 19 and subterfuges are not countenanced." *S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Rels.*, 48 Cal. 3d  
 20 341, 349 (1989); *see also Secci v. United Independant Taxi Drivers, Inc.*, 8 Cal. App. 5th 846, 862  
 21 (2017) (holding that evidence of the parties' contractual performance was sufficient to sustain jury's  
 22 finding that the plaintiff-driver was an employee of the defendant-company even though the parties'  
 23 contract stated the driver was an independent contractor).

24           No resort to course of performance or other extrinsic evidence was permissible to alter  
 25 unambiguous and binding terms of the Agreements (i.e., the federal regulations that define lender service  
 26 providers). *See Navcom Tech., Inc. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.*, No. 5:12-cv-04175-EJD, 2017 WL  
 27 2617977 at \*3 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2017) ("Course of performance evidence may only be used to explain  
 28 or supplement the terms of a contract (Cal. Civ. Code § 1856(c)); not 'to prove a meaning to which the

language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.’ It also cannot be used to ‘vary or contradict the unambiguous terms of a written agreement.’” (internal citations omitted)). The Arbitrator also seemed to suggest that he could avoid applying federal law as well as the unambiguous terms of the Agreements based on the prior litigation (or pre-litigation) positions of Benworth or its principal. (App. 3155.) But the fully integrated Agreements deem the SBA Regulations to control their contractual relationship, including when they conflict with the terms of the Agreements themselves, not extrinsic evidence. (App. 3986; App. 3985, § 16 (“No waiver by either party, whether express or implied, of any provisions of this Agreement . . . shall constitute a continuing waiver of such provision or a breach or waiver of any other provision of this Agreement.”).)

\* \* \*

For the foregoing reasons, the undisputed, legally dispositive facts and the Arbitrator’s findings in the Final Award do not permit any conclusion other than that Womply is a lender service provider. This Court is thus presented “with the extraordinary circumstance in which the arbitrator’s own rulings make clear that, more than being simply erroneous, his finding is completely inexplicable and borders on the irrational.” *Garvey*, 203 F.3d at 590. “In this circumstance, given the arbitrator’s professional experience, the decision can be explained only by his desire to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” *Id.* at 590-91. “No other plausible explanation exists.” *Id.* at 591.

### C. The Final Award Grants Relief Not Permitted by the Agreements.

The Agent Fee Cap applies to the Technology Fees. *See supra*, Part I.A. Womply is a lender service provider. *See supra*, Part I. B. The facts of this case can only support those conclusions. Notwithstanding, the Arbitrator ordered Benworth to pay Womply additional fees in violation of the controlling SBA Regulations incorporated in the Agreements. In doing so, the Arbitrator disregarded “specific contract provision[s] to correct what he perceived as an injustice.” *Pacific Motor*, 702 F.2d at 177. The result is an award that should be vacated because it “conflicts directly with the contract.” *Id.*

Two SBA Regulations that the parties agreed to be bound by govern Womply’s entitlement to fees under the Agreements. The first SBA Regulation requires Agents, including lender service providers, to provide compensation agreements to the SBA for its review. 13 C.F.R. 103.5(a) (“Any Applicant, Agent, or Packager must execute and provide to SBA a compensation agreement, and any

1 Lender Service Provider must execute and provide to SBA a Lender Service Provider agreement.”).  
 2 With respect to Agents other than lender service providers, the Agent must submit Form 159 to the SBA.  
 3 *Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441 at \*7 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)). Womply and Benworth “did not  
 4 submit Form 159 to the SBA and courts uniformly hold this precludes any recovery of SBA fees.” *Id.*

5 Next, with respect to lender service provider agreements, the SOPs state a lender service provider  
 6 “may only receive compensation” from the lender “for services provided under an SBA-reviewed”  
 7 lender service provider agreement. (App. 3442; *see also* 13 C.F.R. § 103.5(c) (“Each Lender Service  
 8 Provider must enter into a written agreement with each lender for whom it acts in that capacity. SBA  
 9 will review all such agreements.”).) Again, the Arbitrator already stated his opinion on what this  
 10 provision means: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] (App. 2801:12-18.)

12 As the Final Award confirms, there is no dispute that the Agreements were not submitted to the  
 13 SBA. (App. 3130.) If the Arbitrator enforced these terms of the Agreements, as he pledged to do, then  
 14 the Final Award would reflect that Womply is not entitled to any further fees. But the Arbitrator failed  
 15 to do so. In fact, the Final Award does not even acknowledge Benworth’s argument that, because the  
 16 Referral Agreement was not submitted to the SBA, no additional Referral Fees are owed to Womply.  
 17 (App. 345; App. 2605; App. 2670-74.)

18 Notwithstanding the fact that the Agreements were not submitted to the SBA, the Arbitrator held  
 19 that, even if he concluded Womply was a lender service provider, he still would have awarded Womply  
 20 additional fees under the Agreements. (App. 3156-58.) That decision was not based on the terms of the  
 21 Agreements. Rather, the Arbitrator employed equitable principles, noting that Womply introduced  
 22 “copious evidence of the efforts that went into developing its Fast Lane and related Teslar systems and  
 23 the various application within those systems for which Womply had to pay a fee.” (App. 3158.) The  
 24 Arbitrator then reasoned that “[f]ailing to compensate Womply for these efforts would result in a  
 25 disproportionately harsh penalty.” (*Id.*) The Arbitrator also concluded that Womply is still entitled to  
 26 additional fees because the SOPs do not state that an agreement is illegal or invalid if it is not submitted  
 27 to the SBA. (App. 3156-57.) The Arbitrator missed the point.

1       The Agreements were not simply entered into with the backdrop of SBA Regulations. The  
 2 Agreements clearly and expressly—as the Final Award admits (App. 3164)—incorporate SBA  
 3 Regulations. And, further, the Agreements provide that the SBA Regulations would supersede contrary  
 4 provisions in the Agreements. (App. 3988, §4 (“Notwithstanding the foregoing *or any provision of this*  
 5 *Agreement to the contrary*, this Agreement is subject to all Applicable Laws, including SBA  
 6 Regulations. In the event of any conflict between the governing law and the SBA Regulations, the **SBA**  
 7 **Regulations shall control.**” (emphases added)); App. 3984, § 9.) The Parties expressly agreed that SBA  
 8 Regulations “shall control” and be applicable notwithstanding “any provision of this Agreement,”  
 9 including those related to Womply’s claimed Technology Fees. (E.g., App. 3988, § 4.) Per the Final  
 10 Award, each term of the contract must be given effect, and the Arbitrator cannot strike terms that  
 11 Womply regrets. (See App. 3165-66 (citing *Series AGI W. Linn of Appian Grp. Invs. DE LLC v. Eves*  
 12 (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 164 (“[C]ourts will not rewrite contracts to relieve parties from bad deals  
 13 nor make better deals for parties than they negotiated for themselves.”).)

14       Moreover, the Arbitrator had no authority to employ equitable principles to save Womply’s  
 15 breach of contract claims. Indeed, the Arbitrator failed to draw a critical distinction between the  
 16 respective standards for Benworth’s defenses and counterclaims on this issue. Benworth does not deny  
 17 that the Arbitrator had the authority to rely on equity to deny Benworth the right of disgorgement of fees  
 18 Benworth previously paid to Womply that violate SBA Regulations (which are indisputably  
 19 incorporated into the Agreements). But with respect to whether Benworth had a legal obligation to pay  
 20 further fees (i.e., the third element of Womply’s breach of contract claims), as a matter of California law  
 21 and the Parties’ governing Agreements, equity cannot save Womply, authorizing further compensation  
 22 by using equitable principles to eviscerate an express provision of the Agreements. Put differently, the  
 23 Arbitrator had no discretion to permit additional fees under Agreements that did not comply with SBA  
 24 Regulations.

25       Worse, the Arbitrator ruled that Womply would still be entitled to additional compensation  
 26 because California law provides an exception to the general rule that contracts made in violation of a  
 27 regulation are void. (App. 3157-58.) There is no way to reconcile this ruling with the unequivocal  
 28 requirement in the Agreements that SBA regulations control in the case of any conflict with California

1 law. California law cannot provide Womply with compensation when SBA regulations state Womply is  
 2 entitled to none. The Arbitrator simply applied his own rough sense of justice—rather than applying the  
 3 contractual regime the Parties agreed would govern. The Arbitrator clearly disregarded the SBA  
 4 Regulations to avoid imposing what he perceived as a “disproportionately harsh penalty” on Womply.  
 5 (App. 3158.)

6 This same type of reasoning led the Ninth Circuit to affirm the vacatur of arbitration awards in  
 7 *Aspic* and *American Postal*. *Aspic* involved a dispute between an Afghan subcontractor and a contractor,  
 8 who was engaged by the U.S. government for construction projects in Afghanistan. 913 F.3d at 1164.  
 9 The subcontracts between the parties incorporated federal regulations by reference, with those  
 10 regulations governing the performance of the work and the requirements for obtaining compensation.  
 11 *Id.* One of those regulations required the Afghan subcontractor to submit its documents supporting  
 12 reimbursement in the English language, which it did not do. *Id.* at 1168. The Arbitrator determined that  
 13 strictly enforcing the regulatory requirements “would result in a forfeiture and unfairness” to the Afghan  
 14 subcontractor. *Id.*

15 The Ninth Circuit held that, “[b]y concluding that [the Afghan subcontractor] need not comply  
 16 with the FAR requirements, the Arbitrator exceeded his authority and failed to draw the essence of the  
 17 Award from the Subcontracts.” *Id.* “The Award disregarded specific provisions of the plain text in an  
 18 effort to prevent what the Arbitrator deemed an unfair result.” *Id.* “Such an award is ‘irrational.’” *Id.*  
 19 The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that it is a “serious matter when an arbitral award determines that a  
 20 (sub)contractor need not comply with the federal contracting regulations when no past practices  
 21 demonstrate variation from those requirements.” *Id.* at 1168. “To allow contractors and subcontractors,  
 22 foreign or domestic, to evade the FAR provisions because a subcontractor was too unsophisticated or  
 23 inexperienced to fully understand them would potentially cripple the government’s ability to contract  
 24 with private entities, and would violate controlling federal law.” *Id.* at 1168-69.

25 Similarly, as discussed above, *see supra* pp. 45-46, in *American Postal*, the Ninth Circuit  
 26 considered the vacatur of an arbitral award that ordered the Postal Service to reinstate a former employee  
 27 who participated in a strike. There, the arbitrator ordered reinstatement because he believed the “penalty  
 28 of discharge” would be “too severe.” 682 F.2d at 1284. In affirming vacatur, the Ninth Circuit held that

1 the “district judge properly denied enforcement of the arbitrator’s award” because reinstatement “would  
 2 violate 5 U.S.C. s. 7311.” *Id.* at 1286.

3 The same reasoning in *Aspic* and *American Postal* applies here. The SBA has determined that  
 4 Agents, including lender service providers, may only receive compensation from a lender when the SBA  
 5 has reviewed the agreements. It is undisputed that the SBA did not review the Agreements. The  
 6 Arbitrator had no authority to override federal law and dispense his own brand of industrial justice. This  
 7 Court must vacate the Award.

8 **II. THE FINAL AWARD IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT COMPELS BENWORTH  
 9 TO VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY.**

10 “Judicial deference to an arbitrator’s remedy is not required where a remedy violates an explicit,  
 11 well-defined public policy.” *Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix Mailers Union Loc. 752, Int’l Bhd. of  
 12 Teamsters*, 989 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1993). “To vacate an arbitration award on public policy  
 13 grounds, the court must find (1) an explicit, well-defined policy and (2) that the policy is one that  
 14 specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” *United Transp. Union*, 116 F.3d at 433.  
 15 Examples of explicit, well-defined public policies include statutes, implementing regulations, and case  
 16 law interpreting the statutes and regulations. *See Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc.*  
 17 *1877, AFL CIO*, 530 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2008).

18 The explicit, well-defined policies here are the SBA Regulations and interpretations of those  
 19 regulations that require agents, lender service providers, and lenders to submit compensation agreements  
 20 for review by the SBA. 13 C.F.R. § 103.5(a), (c). As noted above (*see supra*, pp.58-59), with respect to  
 21 compensation agreements for agents other than lender service providers, the agent must submit SBA  
 22 Form 159 and “courts uniformly hold” that the failure to do so “precludes recovery of any SBA fees.”  
 23 *Capital Plus*, 2022 WL 1488441 at \*7 (citing *Daniel T.A. Cotts PLLC v. Am. Bank, N.A.*, 2:20-CV-185,  
 24 2021 WL 2196636, at \*4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2021) (collecting cases)). And the SBA has determined that  
 25 lender service providers “may only receive compensation from the 7(a) lender for services provided under  
 26 an SBA-reviewed LSP Agreement.” (App. 3442.) SBA regulations require Benworth to comply with this  
 27 provision of the SOPs. *See* 13 C.F.R. § 120.180 (providing SBA lenders “must comply” with “Loan  
 28 Program Requirements for the 7(a) Loan Program”); *see also* 13 C.F.R. 120.10 (defining “Loan Program

1 Requirements” to include “SBA Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs”); (App. 3865, art. III.D.1.  
 2 (“Loans will be guaranteed under the PPP under the same terms, conditions and processes as other 7(a)  
 3 loans . . .”)).

4 These SBA Regulations are public policies that specifically militate against the relief ordered by  
 5 the Arbitrator. The policies are against Agents, including lender service providers, receiving SBA fees  
 6 under compensation agreements that have not been reviewed by the SBA. Under similar circumstances,  
 7 courts in the Ninth Circuit have vacated arbitral awards on public policy grounds and this Court should  
 8 do so here. *See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers*, 989 F.2d at 1083-84 (directing district court to vacate arbitral  
 9 award that required the parties to agree on a higher wage rate in violation of a statute that required the  
 10 parties to engage in only good faith bargaining); *Broadway Cab Co-op., Inc. v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs*  
 11 *Local Union No. 281, IBT*, 710 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court’s confirmation  
 12 of arbitral award where the award was “contrary to law and public policy” because the arbitrator  
 13 contradicted Supreme Court precedent and applied an incorrect legal standard to the issue of whether  
 14 taxicab owner-operators were independent contractors or employees); *see also supra*, pp. 61-62  
 15 (discussing *American Postal* and *Aspic*).

16 **III. THE ARBITRATOR IS GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT FOR REFUSING TO POSTPONE**  
 17 **THE PROCEEDINGS UNTIL THE SBA COMPLETES ITS INVESTIGATION OF**  
 18 **WOMPLY.**

19 Courts may also vacate an arbitral award “where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in  
 20 refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent  
 21 and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been  
 22 prejudiced[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). “The arbitrary denial of a reasonable request for a postponement may  
 23 serve as grounds for vacating an arbitration award.” *Naing Int’l Enters.*, 961 F. Supp. at \*3. Although  
 24 arbitrators are accorded a degree of discretion with respect to a requested postponement, “if the failure  
 25 of an arbitrator to grant a postponement or adjournment results in the foreclosure of the presentation of  
 26 ‘pertinent and material evidence,’ it is an abuse of discretion.” *Id.* Such is the case here.

27 There can be no dispute that the results of the SBA’s investigation into Womply constitute  
 28 pertinent and material evidence. The Agreements expressly contemplated that the SBA’s determinations  
 would be dispositive of any dispute. *See* (App. 3983, § 2.3 (providing that Womply shall return to

1 Benworth any fees that the SBA “determines were not in compliance with applicable SBA and/or PPP  
2 Loan Program Requirements”); App. 3988, § 2.3.) [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]

12 There also can be no dispute that issuing the Award before the SBA completed its investigation  
13 was severely prejudicial to Benworth. The Arbitrator refused to consider the Congressional Report,  
14 which completely corroborated Benworth’s position on whether Womply was a lender service provider.  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED] (App. 310-12.) [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] the results of the SBA’s investigation  
19 were the only evidence left for Benworth to present to the Arbitrator on the issues of whether Womply  
20 was a lender service provider and whether Womply must return fees in excess of the Agent Fee Cap to  
21 Benworth. *See Temp Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc.*, 120 F.3d 16, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the  
22 district court should have vacated an arbitral award because the arbitration panel refused to defer ruling  
23 until a witness was available where that witness was “the only person” who could provide rebuttal  
24 testimony on certain issues). Meanwhile, in the Final Award (App. 3153), the Arbitrator faulted  
25 Benworth for not introducing the very evidence he foreclosed Benworth from producing. *See Lindsey v.*  
26 *Travelers Com. Ins. Co.*, No. 22-16795, 2023 WL 8613598, at \*1 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2023) (affirming  
27 vacatur of arbitral award because the proceeding was “fundamentally unfair” where the arbitrator denied  
28 the claimant’s discovery request for statistical data related to a disparate treatment claim and then

1 granted summary judgment against the claimant for failing to present evidence that race was a factor in  
 2 his compensation). Thus, by issuing the Final Award prior to the completion of the SBA's investigation,  
 3 the Arbitrator foreclosed Benworth from presenting pertinent and material evidence in support of its  
 4 defenses and counterclaims.

5 Similar circumstances led to the vacatur of an arbitral award in *Naing*. *Naing* involved the alleged  
 6 breach of a merger agreement, which included representations and warranties by one of the parties that  
 7 it had complied with all SBA program requirements and did not engage in any conduct that would  
 8 warrant suspension from the SBA program. During the underlying arbitration, it came to light that the  
 9 party who made those representations was being investigated by the SBA and the other party moved to  
 10 postpone the hearing pending the completion of the investigation. The arbitrators refused to postpone  
 11 the hearing and subsequently entered an award in favor of the party subject to the investigation. The  
 12 court concluded that the arbitrators abused their discretion in denying the postponement and vacated the  
 13 award, explaining, “[r]egardless of whether the results of the investigation would have exonerated or  
 14 condemned [the investigated party], the arbitrators' conclusions clearly were less informed without the  
 15 SBA's conclusions in the record.” 961 F. Supp. at 5-6.

16 This case is directly on point with *Naing*. The only difference is that, in *Naing*, the record  
 17 contained a date certain by when the SBA would complete its investigation. *Id.* at 4. However, as *Naing*  
 18 observed, “neither this Court nor the arbitration panel can allow the pursuit of an expedient adjudication  
 19 to outweigh its obligation to ensure a just and fair one.” 961 F. Supp. at 5-6. Indeed, in *Matter of*  
 20 *Insurance Co. of N. Am. v St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co.*, 215 A.D.2d 386, 626 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1995),  
 21 relied upon by the *Naing* court, the court vacated an arbitral award because the arbitrators refused to  
 22 postpone the hearing until the completion of a criminal investigation that directly related to the incident  
 23 at issue in the arbitration, without any reference to a deadline by when that investigation would be  
 24 completed.

25 Here, the Arbitrator allowed expediency to outweigh his obligation to ensure a fundamentally  
 26 fair hearing. [REDACTED]  
 27 [REDACTED] the Arbitrator  
 28 refused to defer his ruling until the SBA completed its investigation of Womply. In so doing, the

1 Arbitrator not only foreclosed Benworth from presenting evidence pertinent and material to its defenses  
 2 and counterclaims, but the Arbitrator also usurped the role of the SBA and granted himself the authority  
 3 to make final policy decisions about one of the most unprecedented government relief programs in  
 4 American history.

5 This matter is not just a contract dispute between private parties. Rather, as the SBA's suspension  
 6 letter to Womply established, Womply's PPP-related activities concern [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] (App. 4022.) This Court  
 8 should not allow the Arbitrator to compromise the interests of the federal government and the integrity  
 9 of SBA programs simply because the SBA is conducting a careful and thorough investigation.  
 10 Investigations of this nature take time. For example, it was not until March 2024 that the Federal Trade  
 11 Commission filed its complaint against Womply for engaging in fraudulent and deceptive trade practices  
 12 in connection with the PPP. (See App. 3072-90.)

13 The Arbitrator should have deferred ruling on this dispute until the SBA completed its  
 14 investigation of Womply. His failure to do so foreclosed Benworth from presenting evidence pertinent  
 15 and material to its defenses and counterclaims. The Final Award must be vacated.

## 16 CONCLUSION

17 This case involves more than a commercial dispute between private parties. It also concerns the  
 18 federal government's interest in overseeing the expenditure of billions of dollars of taxpayer funds and  
 19 the integrity of current and future government relief programs. By issuing the Final Award before the  
 20 SBA completed its investigation of Womply and by making his own policy decisions on SBA rules and  
 21 regulations, the Arbitrator exceeded his powers and is guilty of misconduct warranting vacatur of the  
 22 Final Award.

23 If left uncorrected, the Award—in the short term—will deny Benworth the relief that it is  
 24 rightfully entitled to and that is necessary for Benworth to continue to meet its PPP obligations.  
 25 Benworth remains responsible for responding to subpoenas, communicating with borrowers about the  
 26 forgiveness and/or repayment process, monthly reporting to the SBA, cooperating with SBA audits and  
 27 government agency investigations into fraud, submitting guarantee purchase applications (which could  
 28 be used to repay the Federal Reserve), and handling PPP loans that are in collections. As the Federal

1 Reserve has warned, Womply's efforts to collect on the Final Award "cripple the ability of Benworth to  
 2 continue" servicing its PPP loans.

3 But in the long term, the costs will fall on the federal government and taxpayers as a whole by  
 4 conferring upon private arbitrators the unreviewable power to construe and apply federal regulations  
 5 and to make policy decisions critical to federal relief programs. This Court cannot allow Womply to  
 6 take an additional \$118 million from a federal loan program in violation of the plain terms of the  
 7 implementing regulations, on top of the approximately \$2 billion in taxpayer funds it already collected,  
 8 while it remains under investigation by the federal agency charged with enforcing compliance with those  
 9 very regulations. The Court should vacate the Final Award.

10  
 11 Dated: August 7, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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**ATTESTATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL LOCAL RULE 5-1(i)(3)**

I, Simon S. Grille, am the ECF User whose identification and password are being used to file this Notice of Petition and Petition to Vacate Final Arbitration Award Pursuant to Civil L.R. 5-1(i)(3), I attest under penalty of perjury that concurrence in this filing has been obtained from counsel.

/s/ Simon S. Grille

Simon S. Grille